Chapter 7　What is happening abroad

Key points

• The strategy (November 2024) listed seven overseas companies as "under construction" or "planned"A · EV-075. Two years later, in October 2026, the companies announcing continuous operation of GW-class lines are two in China: GCL (Kunshan, full process running since September 2026) and UtmoLight (Wuxi, operating since February 2025). GCL's 2026 shipment guidance is 50–100 MWB · CL-035
• In Europe, Oxford PV (UK and Germany) made its first commercial shipment in September 2024 and runs its tandem line in Brandenburg, rated at tens of MW, on two shifts. Mass production is targeted for 2027 and a new plant for late 2027 to early 2028. Poland's Saule Technologies failed to complete a capital increase in June 2025, was delisted in June 2026 and has ceased operations; its main shareholder says "not a single module was produced on the production line"A · EV-064, EV-065
• Hanwha Qcells of Korea moved its tandem mass-production target from the first half of 2027 (as stated in May 2025) to the end of 2028, and a GW-class plant to 2029, in October 2026B · EV-066
• IEA PVPS recorded that "large-scale commercial production had not started" as of the end of 2024A · EV-069. The strategy's 10 yen self-sustaining level rests on cumulative production of just over 80 GW (Chapter 1); overseas annual shipments in 2026 add up to hundreds of MWC · CL-036
• In November 2025 IEEFA cited durability of 5–12 years and manufacturers' cost outlooks above the government targets, and recommended confining perovskite to applications where silicon cannot be installed and to tandem cellsA · EV-027

1. The overseas picture as the strategy presented it (November 2024)

Page 14 of the strategy, "Development trends at overseas companies", summarises overseas companies as follows, drawing on the commissioned study (BCG) and public informationA · EV-075.

This table showed a row of GW-class plans abroad and fed the strategy's logic that, because "the domestic market is small compared with the overseas market", overseas expansion should be in view from the start.

2. The companies as of October 2026

2-1. China

GCL Optoelectronics (Kunshan) held an opening ceremony for the first 1 GW phase of its production base on 24 June 2025 (total investment 5 billion yuan, target 2 GW)A · EV-067. In April 2026 it said "1 GW is in operation; 2026 shipments about 100 MW", and in an interview in June 2026 that "2026 is the first year of mass production, shipments start by the end of the third quarter, 50–70 MW in the first year". In mid-September 2026 it announced that the full process, from raw-material input to large-area modules, was running continuously and that "commercial shipments are gradually increasing". Its stated priorities are equipment utilisation, yield, material utilisation and unit manufacturing costB · EV-067.

On cost, the founder has said that at 500 MW of output the cost is about twice that of silicon, at 1 GW about 1.5 times, and at 3 GW approaching siliconB · EV-067. This outlook has the same structure as the strategy's learning curve: cost falls with production scale.

UtmoLight (Wuxi) announced the start of a GW-class line in February 2025, expecting 1.8 million modules a year at full output, and has published a stabilised efficiency of 18.1% (NREL-measured) for a 0.72 m² moduleB · EV-068. We have found no announcement of progress on the "expansion to 10 GW by end-2026" that the strategy cited.

Microquanta (Hangzhou and Quzhou) has run a 100 MW-class line since 2022 and in February 2026 published a year of operating data from an 8.6 MW plantA · EV-068. Its GW-class line in Quzhou was "due to start formal operation in March" as of February 2025, but trade media in June 2026 still described it as under construction. Cumulative installations exceed 30 MW (company statement, August 2026)B · EV-068.

2-2. Europe

Oxford PV (UK / Germany) made its first commercial shipment, 72-cell tandem modules at 24.5% efficiency, to a US customer in September 2024A · EV-065. At the Brandenburg plant, silicon bottom-cell production is rated at about 100 MW and the integrated tandem line "at tens of MW on four continuous shifts"; in practice it runs two shifts split between commercial production and development. The current product is about 25% efficient; targets are 26% with a 15-year warranty in 2026, 27% with 20 years in 2027 and 30% with 30 years in 2030. Mass production is targeted for 2027, with manufacturing at a new plant starting late 2027 to early 2028. The company licenses to Trina Solar in China and First Solar in the US and does not intend to manufacture at scale itselfB · EV-065. It employs more than 100 people and was still hiring in April 2026.

Saule Technologies (Poland), which the strategy listed as "about 100 MW planned (2026)", failed in June 2025 to secure sufficient subscriptions for a 100 million zloty capital increase, cancelled its shareholder meeting and began preparing for restructuring proceedings. Its main shareholder, Columbus Energy, wrote off its entire equity stake (over 44 million zloty) and loans (12 million zloty) as of 30 June 2025, citing "analysis of the future prospects of perovskite technology" among the reasons in a January 2026 statement. Columbus's CEO said that "about 300 million zloty was invested over 11 years, but not a single perovskite module was produced on the production line". The company had no business activity as of May 2026 and was delisted from the Warsaw Stock Exchange's NewConnect market on 26 June 2026 for failing to file its 2024 and 2025 financial reportsA · EV-064. The founders have criticised the investors' conduct, and the account of events is contested.

2-3. Korea

Hanwha Qcells has a 40 MW pilot line at its Jincheon plant (operating since 2024) and has published a certified efficiency of 28% for a large-area cell. Its mass-production target moved from "first half of 2027" in May 2025 to "start of cell and module mass production by the end of 2028" at a briefing on 15 October 2026, with a GW-class plant in 2029, a slip of about a year and a half. The plant location is undecided, and the company has indicated that "industrial policy may determine the location"B · EV-066.

2-4. The international agencies' summary

The IEA PVPS annual report (October 2025) notes that several companies, mainly in China, have started pilot lines and demonstration shipments, but that "large-scale commercial production had not started as of the end of 2024"A · EV-069.

3. Against the strategy's premises

Overseas production is starting up, but 2026 shipment volumes are two to three orders of magnitude below the cumulative production (just over 80 GW) on which the strategy based its self-sustaining levelC · CL-036. That does not mean rapid expansion will not follow: GCL's outlook of approaching silicon at 3 GW, or Oxford PV's licensing strategy, would change the picture if realised. What can be confirmed is that the overseas scale the 2024 strategy assumed had not become a record by 2026.

4. IEEFA's recommendation

On 25 November 2025 the US-based Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) published "Japan needs a more nuanced perovskite strategy"A · EV-027. Its main points:

• Against the government targets (production capacity above 1 GW by 2030, 20 GW by 2040, LCOE of 10–14 yen), the leading manufacturer's own outlook is far higher (Sekisui Chemical: about 20 yen in 2030)
• Durability is 5–12 years, short of silicon's 25 years. Many companies in demonstration have not published stability data or lifetimes
• 54.8 billion yen went to "next-generation renewables" in FY2022–2024, with about 1 trillion yen of spending planned over the next ten years
• Established technologies such as silicon solar should take priority, and perovskite should be confined to applications where silicon cannot be installed and to tandem cells: a "more nuanced strategy"

IEEFA's reading is consistent with the government's own generation-cost review examined in Chapter 4 (perovskite 15.3 yen against utility-scale 7.9 yen) and with the unit costs of the Ministry of the Environment's subsidies in Chapter 5. IEEFA's "54.8 billion yen", however, matches the FY2024 budget line for the GX Supply Chain programme, which also covers water electrolysis and offshore wind. Awards to perovskite alone are larger (Sekisui Chemical's single award has a ceiling of 157.25 billion yen); amounts by programme are set out in the public support register (Japanese).

On 29 October 2026 we sent the author of the IEEFA commentary this series' primary sources (the trace of the 20 GW figure through meetings 1–8 and the relevant pages of the generation-cost review). Any reply will be reflected in this chapter.

5. What we know so far, and what we do not

What we know

• Two Chinese companies announce continuous operation of GW-class lines; 2026 shipment guidance is at most 100 MW
• Oxford PV continues commercial shipments at a scale of tens of MW, with mass production from 2027 at the earliest
• Saule Technologies has ceased operations and been delisted; Hanwha has moved mass production to the end of 2028
• IEA PVPS recorded no large-scale commercial production as of the end of 2024
• Overseas shipments in 2026 are two to three orders of magnitude below the 80 GW cumulative figure the strategy assumed

What we do not know (being checked)

• The position of Dazheng Micro-Nano, Wonder Solar and Renshine Solar in 2025–2026 (no primary information obtained)
• Oxford PV's 2026 shipment volume; the start date of Microquanta's GW-class line
• Chinese companies' warranty terms and outdoor generation records (kWh)
• The original BCG overseas survey used for p.14 of the strategy (subject of disclosure request 01)

Sources

Company figures are self-reported; items without third-party confirmation are graded B. URLs and retrieval dates for every document are in the evidence register and primary-source list (Japanese).

Pages in this series

• Series home
• Chapter 1 Where did 20 GW come from?
• Chapter 2 What the council discussed (Japanese)
• Chapter 3 Who decided, who received (Japanese)
• Chapter 4 Comparing generation costs
• Chapter 5 Demand created by subsidies (Japanese)
• Chapter 6 How the press reported it (Japanese)
• Chapter 7 What is happening abroad
• Chapter 8 What the same money could have bought
• Chapter 9 Open questions to the government (Japanese)
• Policy timeline (Japanese)
• Public support register (Japanese)
• Evidence register and primary sources (Japanese; CSV)

Related pages

• Rethinking perovskite solar from zero (Japanese) — Checking the technical, economic and institutional premises one by one.
• Reviewing MRI's perovskite industrial-policy column (Japanese) — The 'Team Japan' argument against primary sources.
• JC-STAR and grid cyber-resilience: an effectiveness check — An earlier I-S3 investigation using the same evidence-register method.

Citation and reuse

The CSV and Markdown source files (index) are released under CC BY 4.0. You may copy, adapt and use them commercially if you credit I-S3 Co., Ltd. and link to this page. Quotations from the text with attribution are welcome.

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Suggested citation

Masuda, S. (2026). "Chapter 7　What is happening abroad". I-S3 Co., Ltd., published 2026-10-29, https://www.i-s3.com/perovskite-policy-investigation-ch7-overseas-en.html