This article is written not only for solar PV engineers, but also for power producers, construction companies, fire and administrative personnel, and equipment owners. Rather than starting with an explanation of standard numbers, it begins with one question: when you turn off the inverter (PCS, inverter) in a solar power plant, is it really stopped? Definitions of terms, the background to the emergence of North American regulations, and the content of Japanese laws and fire service materials are cited in the text and organized as major references at the end.

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1. The PCS was turned off. Even so, 600V remains

In ordinary electrical equipment, "turning off the power" and "becoming de-energized" are almost the same thing. If you trip the main breaker in a distribution board, voltage disappears from the downstream wiring. If the utility service is disconnected, no electricity enters the building. This sense does not apply to solar PV systems.

A solar PV system uses the solar module (panel) itself as the power source. As long as light is hitting the module, it generates voltage no matter who operates what. The PCS is a device that converts that DC into AC and sends it to the grid or the building; it is not the power source. Therefore, even if all of the following operations are performed, voltage remains in the wiring from the module to the PCS DC input terminals.

  • Turn off the main breaker
  • Stop PCS operation
  • Disconnect from the grid (isolate)
  • Press the emergency stop button

If shown as a schematic diagram, it looks like this.

[通常運転]
  PVモジュール → DCストリング → PCS → AC → 系統
   (電源)         (数百V DC)     (変換)  (100/200V)

[PCS停止・主幹OFF・系統解列]
  PVモジュール → DCストリング ──┐
   (発電継続)     (数百V DCが残る) │
                                 × PCS停止   × AC無電圧   × 系統切離し
  ←──── ここまでは日射があれば電圧が存在し得る ────→

Stopping power generation, stopping the PCS, disconnecting from the grid, and making the DC circuit safe are all different concepts. PCS stop and grid disconnection are operations that stop AC-side output. To make the DC circuit safe, a different means is needed, such as stopping output near the modules, shading the modules, or disconnecting wiring that people can touch from the modules. The entire article is built on this distinction.

2. Why is it difficult to turn off PV alone?

Open-circuit voltage determined by the number of series-connected modules

In residential and industrial solar power generation, it is common to connect about 10 to 15 modules in series to form one string. The open-circuit voltage (Voc) of recent 400 to 450 W class modules is generally around 40 to 50 V per module. What determines the value is the number of cells in series; for example, a 430 W product with 108 half-cells has a Voc of about 39 V, and a 445 W product with 144 half-cells has about 53 V, as can be confirmed in the published datasheets[19]. When connected in series, the voltages add up.

  • 10 modules in series → approx. 400 to 500 V (approx. 390 V for 39 V modules, approx. 530 V for 53 V modules)
  • 15 modules in series → about 600 to 750V (about 800V for 53V modules)

This is the value when the PCS is not operating. When the PCS is stopped and no current is flowing, the module shows its highest voltage, the open-circuit voltage. The lower the temperature, the higher the open-circuit voltage becomes (example temperature coefficient: −0.24%/K; at a cell temperature of −10°C, it is about 8% higher than under standard conditions), so on a clear winter morning it is higher than on a summer afternoon [19]. The National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST) guide also states that even if equipment operation is stopped during the day, individual modules continue to generate open-circuit voltage, and that the voltage of the entire system is generally about 300V for residential use, about 600V for private use, and about 1000V for highly electrified systems [15].

"No current is flowing" and "safe to touch" are not the same

If the PCS is stopped, no current is flowing through the wiring. But the reason no current is flowing is simply that the circuit is not closed. If a person touches it and closes the circuit, current will flow through the body. Because solar cells have properties close to those of a constant-current source, the short-circuit current of a single module reaches around 10A, but the current that flows through the human body is determined by voltage and contact resistance. According to the reference values for human response cited in the Tokyo Fire Department's verification report, at 10 to 20mA muscles become paralyzed and a person can no longer let go of the source by their own will (let-go current), and at 50mA abnormalities occur in the heart and respiratory system [13]. If a person touches several hundred volts of DC through wet hands or damaged insulation, this level is easily exceeded.

Why DC arcs are difficult to extinguish

Another phenomenon unique to DC is arcing. AC crosses zero voltage 100 to 120 times per second (zero crossing). An arc is likely to extinguish at that moment, and once extinguished it is difficult to reignite. DC has no such zero crossing. A report by Sandia National Laboratories in the United States explains that "DC arcs do not pass through current zero every half cycle like AC arcs, so extinguishing them is far more difficult" [25]. The AIST guide also explains that in DC circuits for solar power generation, "because there is no moment when the voltage becomes 0, once an arc occurs it is difficult to extinguish even if the voltage fluctuates," and introduces U.S. fire cases in which an arc bridging a distance of as much as 15 cm is suspected [15]. This is why poor connector contact, pinched cables, and loose terminals can become a sustained arc in DC and serve as an ignition source.

However, the simplification that DC is always more dangerous than AC should be avoided. The risk of electric shock and arcing varies depending on voltage, current, circuit configuration such as grounding method and number of parallel strings, the presence of circuit breakers and protective devices, and contact conditions such as dryness or wetness, skin condition, and protective equipment. The characteristic of DC is that it is hard to extinguish and does not stop unless stopped at the power source, and if design and procedures are based on this characteristic, it can be managed. The problem is sites where that premise is not shared.

3. PV-specific characteristics seen from fire scenes

Let us think from a firefighter's perspective. A building fire has occurred. Utility supply has been cut off. The main breaker has also been turned off. The PCS has stopped. In ordinary electrical equipment, the building is now de-energized. However, if there is solar PV on the roof and it is daytime, the roof modules continue generating power.

In this state, firefighting activities may involve opening the roof, moving near the array, damaging DC cables, applying water, and using metal tools. The core issue is that the common sense of "the building power has been turned off, so it must be de-energized" may not hold for solar PV.

This is something Japanese fire authorities have also recognized. In a March 2013 administrative notice, "Points to Note in Firefighting Activities at Fires in Detached Houses Equipped with Solar Power Generation Systems," the Fire and Disaster Management Agency listed the possibility of electric shock accidents from the initial stage of a fire through to checking for remaining embers, the possibility of electric shock through water when using a straight stream, the possibility of electric shock through insulation materials or metal columns and beams if wiring is severed and touching the building, the possibility that power generation may continue at night due to the light from the flames, the fact that even modules that appear heavily damaged can generate power when exposed to light, and the fact that removed modules can also generate power and pose a risk of electric shock or ignition. As countermeasures, it states to use spray-type water streams, make use of high-voltage rubber gloves, avoid casually touching or damaging modules, and cover the surface of removed modules to block light or place them face down [11].

In fiscal 2013, the Tokyo Fire Department established a review panel with external experts and conducted experiments involving water discharge, destruction, and flame exposure. Its verification report summarizes that even if a panel becomes wet from water discharge, there is no risk of electric shock if there is no damage or cable disconnection, but if the panel is damaged or the cable is detached or cut and then becomes wet, a risk of electric shock arises; that even if a panel is destroyed with a breaking tool, in most cases the voltage drop is limited to the damaged area; and that after damage from flame exposure, the panel may still be generating power. Under water-discharge conditions with measurement points placed on a destroyed panel, a current of up to 10mA was measured [13]. The review panel's report clearly states that the area with the greatest risk of electric shock during firefighting activities is "the part where DC power is flowing from the PV module to the inverter," and that "even if AC power to the building is cut off, while the PV module is exposed to light, DC power is being charged, creating a risk of electric shock to firefighters during operations" [12].

In other words, Japanese fire departments have understood for more than 10 years that “cutting AC does not mean DC is dead,” and have responded with crew-side protection and procedures. North America chose, in addition, to lower the DC voltage on the equipment side.

4. Why did the United States introduce Rapid Shutdown?

The installation standard for electrical equipment in the United States is NFPA 70, the National Electrical Code (NEC), and solar power generation is covered by Article 690. The NEC is revised every three years, and the version and timing adopted by each state and municipality differ. It is not the case that the latest version is uniformly enforced across the entire United States. According to NFPA's enforcement status list (as of August 3, 2026), 6 states enforce the 2026 edition, 20 the 2023 edition, 15 the 2020 edition, 3 the 2017 edition, and 2 the 2008 edition; for example, California uses the 2023 edition (with state amendments, effective January 2026), Florida uses the 2020 edition, and the City of Chicago uses the 2017 edition (with city amendments) [6]. There are also cases where states adopt the text with amendments; when Connecticut adopted the 2017 edition, it excluded the array boundary requirement (690.12(B)(2)), whose effective date was earlier, through state amendments [6]. When this article describes NEC requirements, it always specifies which edition is being discussed.

The Rapid Shutdown provision, 690.12, was newly established in the 2014 edition. It was created as the result of the firefighter safety task group established under NEC's solar panel (CMP-4), with the aim of enabling first responders to quickly and easily control the solar circuits leaving a building [1]. The commentary at the time of enactment explains that the figures of 30V and 240VA were chosen based on research findings that in wet environments, voltages above 30V pose an electric shock hazard regardless of whether they are AC or DC, and that power above 240VA is also hazardous [1].

The background to this is the Underwriters Laboratories study published in November 2011, "Firefighter Safety and Photovoltaic Installations Research Project." Conducted with funding from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, this study used a live array consisting of 26 modules and demonstrated through experiments that the risk of electric shock from water discharge depends on voltage, water conductivity, distance, and spray pattern (simply changing from a straight stream to a spray of about 10 degrees reduced the measured current below the perception threshold); that firefighter gloves and boots provide only limited protection, and only when insulation is maintained and they are dry; that "shutting down the array is not as simple as opening a switch, and part of the system remains energized as long as it is illuminated"; that even light from a lighting truck or an adjacent fire can cause modules to produce power sufficient to create a lock-on hazard (the 40mA threshold for lock-on was exceeded even at about 12m from a lighting truck and about 23m from an adjacent fire); that to keep the electric shock current from water discharge below 2mA against a 1000V DC source, a distance of about 6m (20ft) was required; and that a damaged array can create unexpected current paths through the mounting structure, metal roof, gutters, and similar components [10]. These findings were used in the 2014 edition of the provision and later in the development of UL 3741 [7].

5. Changes in NEC 690.12

The required content changes with each edition. To avoid confusion, we organize it in a table.

版Applicable conductorsVoltage and time requirementsMain changes and background
NEC 2014Conductors of solar circuits inside a building that exceed 1.5 m (5 ft), or exceed 3 m (10 ft) from the arrayWithin 10 seconds after startup, 30V or less and 240VA or less (between conductors and from conductor to ground)690.12 newly established. Enable first responders to control circuits leaving the building. In the August 2016 TIA 14-10, "10 seconds" was revised to "30 seconds" (to align with the requirement that operation may continue for up to about 20 seconds in response to grid disturbances) [1][2]
NEC 2017"Array boundary" = introduce 305 mm (1 ft) in all directions from the array. Separate requirements inside and outside the boundaryOutside the boundary: 30V or less within 30 seconds. The 240VA requirement was removed.
Inside the boundary: one of the following. (1) A configuration listed (certified) as a rapid shutdown PV array, (2) 80V or less within 30 seconds, (3) an array with no exposed wiring or exposed conductive parts and located at least 2.5m (8ft) from grounded conductive parts
The boundary was reduced from 10 ft to 1 ft, and the requirements were extended into the array interior. Application of the requirements within the boundary has been in effect since January 1, 2019. It specifies startup devices 690.12(C) and signage 690.56(C)[3]
NEC 2020Same as aboveSame as aboveThe wording in boundary area (1) was changed to “PV hazard control system (PVHCS),” with UL 3741 referenced. The compliance route was clarified by standard name[3]
NEC 2023Same as above. However, non-enclosed independent structures such as carports are excluded (Exception 2)Outside the boundary: 30V/30 seconds. Inside the boundary: (1) PVHCS for controlling shock hazards to firefighters, or (2) 80V/30 seconds including inside equipment. The old (3) was deleted (absorbed into UL 3741)The signage requirement was moved from 690.56(C) to 690.12(D). PVRSE and PVHCE are cited as examples in the informational note[3][4]
NEC 2026Same as abovePerformance requirements (30V/80V and 30 seconds) remain unchangedIssued on August 20, 2025 and effective on September 9. The structure of 690.12(B)(C) was reorganized. The types of startup devices were consolidated into “service disconnect, PV disconnect, and listed switches,” and E-stop type switches were explicitly permitted. In TIA 26-2 before issuance, startup devices for one- and two-family dwellings were required to be located outdoors. As of August 2026, six states had adopted it[5][6]

What can be read from this table is that the requirement has expanded step by step from stopping the PCS, to making the voltage at places people can touch fall below a specified value within a specified time, and then to the inside of the array. The 2014 edition targeted wiring leaving the building. In the 2017 edition the array boundary shrank to 1 ft, bringing the target area up onto the roof and right next to the modules. From the 2020 edition onward, there are two approaches: one that specifies by voltage value, and one that evaluates contact with hazards as a system, UL 3741.

6. What are 30V, 30 seconds, and Array Boundary?

We will organize the three values by what each is for.

  • 30 V: This is a guideline voltage judged to pose a low risk of electric shock even if contacted in a wet environment[1]. It is not “zero.” Firefighting uses water, and the equipment is selected on the assumption that responders are wet.
  • 30 seconds: This is the allowable time from startup operation until this voltage is reached. The 10 seconds in the 2014 edition conflicted with grid-side requirements (ride-through during voltage sag, up to about 20 seconds), so TIA extended it to 30 seconds, and it was formally set at 30 seconds in the 2017 edition[2]. The discharge time of the PCS input-stage capacitor is also related to both this time setting and the equipment design.
  • Array Boundary: This is a virtual boundary extending 305 mm (1 ft) in all directions from the array. Outside the boundary is the section where cables pass through inside and outside the building, and 30 V or less is required. Inside the boundary is immediately adjacent to the modules, and a different level is set: 80 V or less or UL 3741 compliance[3].
                 ┌────────── アレイ境界(アレイから305mm / 1ft)──────────┐
                 │  [PV]-[PV]-[PV]-[PV]-[PV]-[PV]-[PV]-[PV]-[PV]-[PV]       │
                 │   境界内:30秒以内に 80V以下、または UL 3741 PVHCS      │
                 └───────────────────────────┬───────────────────────────┘
                                             │  DC配線(屋根→壁→屋内)
                                             │  境界外:30秒以内に 30V以下
                                             ▼
                                     [起動装置] → [PCS](AC側は停止)

The reason the boundary interior is 80V is a practical line that allows the voltage of one module (about 40 to 50V) while preventing two or more modules from remaining in series. If the boundary interior were required to be below 30V, the module output itself would have to be stopped, which is physically almost impossible (only shading would do it).

7. How does Rapid Shutdown work?

Rapid Shutdown is not a simple “emergency stop button.” The button only sends a start signal. What actually lowers the DC voltage is equipment placed near the modules. These two must be understood separately.

[起動側]                              [実行側]
 Rapid Shutdown Initiator                MLPE / RSD / optimizer / microinverter
 (引込開閉器・PV開閉器・              (各モジュールまたは数枚ごとに設置)
   リストされたスイッチ・E-stop)                │
        │                                       │ モジュール近傍で出力を遮断・制限
        ▼                                       ▼
 停止信号 ──→ PCS または transmitter ──→ DC配線上の信号(電力線通信など)
                                       または「信号の消失」そのものが停止指令
                                                │
                                                ▼
                                DCストリング電圧が30秒以内に規定値以下へ

There are two approaches to how signals are conveyed. One is a method in which the PCS or transmitter continuously sends an “operate-through” signal superimposed on the DC wiring, and when that signal disappears, the devices on the module side stop output. Because the signal disappears in any of the following cases—power outage, PCS shutdown, wiring disconnection, or transmitter failure—the design falls to the safe side (fail-safe). The other is a method that sends an explicit stop command. In North America, an industry-common signal standard based on the former concept, the SunSpec Rapid Shutdown signal, is used as the basis for combining PCS from different manufacturers with module-side devices[20].

The devices on the execution side include the following types.

  • Dedicated Rapid Shutdown Device (RSD): A switch installed for every one or two modules that cuts output when the signal is lost. It does not have power optimization functions.
  • Power optimizer (DC-DC type MLPE): Performs module-level maximum power point tracking (MPPT) and monitoring, and lowers output to a safe voltage when stopped. SolarEdge is a representative example.
  • Microinverter (AC type MLPE): Because it converts to AC immediately after the module, there is no high-voltage DC string on the roof in the first place. When stopped, AC output ceases.
  • String-level disconnect unit: Installed near the array and disconnects the string from the PCS side via a remote signal. It can satisfy requirements outside the boundary, but the string voltage inside the array remains.

The amount of voltage left per module after shutdown varies by implementation. In published materials, examples that can be confirmed include 0.6 V per unit for dedicated RSDs (less than 30 V per string), about 1 V for optimizers, a configuration in which microinverters are listed as PVRSE under UL 1741 and no DC string exists, and a switch-type configuration inserted in series within the string that keeps the array boundary at 80 V or less within 30 seconds[21]. In all cases, this is a mechanism in which the PCS reaches out to the modules and stops them, and it is clear that this cannot be achieved by the PCS itself alone.

8. SolarEdge SafeDC implementation example

As an example of Rapid Shutdown implementation, we will take SolarEdge's SafeDC™, which I-S3 has recommended for homes and buildings where people are active. However, let us make one point clear at the outset. SafeDC™ is the name of SolarEdge's safety technology and function, while Rapid Shutdown is a regulatory requirement under NEC 690.12. They are not synonymous. A configuration equipped with SafeDC satisfies the NEC requirement when it meets the certification and installation conditions.

Basic structure

In SolarEdge systems, a power optimizer (DC-DC converter) is attached to each module, and the string made up of optimizers in series is connected to the PCS. During normal operation, the optimizer tracks the maximum power point for each module, and the string voltage is maintained at a fixed value determined by the PCS. When the PCS stops, when the grid is lost, or when the optimizer is disconnected from the PCS, each optimizer reduces its output to about 1 V. SolarEdge's technical documentation states that this safe output voltage is "1 V (±0.1 V)", that the open-circuit voltage of the string becomes "the number of optimizers × 1 V" (about 16 V for a 16-module string), and that this voltage does not depend on the module specifications[9].

[通常運転]  [PV]→[OPT]  [PV]→[OPT]  [PV]→[OPT] … → PCS(ストリング電圧は固定値で運転)
                MPPT        MPPT        MPPT

[PCS停止・系統喪失・切離し]
              [PV]→[OPT]  [PV]→[OPT]  [PV]→[OPT] … → PCS停止
                ~1V         ~1V         ~1V        ストリング ≒ 枚数 × 1V(15枚なら約15V)
              ※ モジュール→オプティマイザー入力の短い区間には、モジュール1枚分の電圧が残る

Relationship with Rapid Shutdown

For North American markets, the documentation states that the system complies with the requirements from NEC 2014 onward, that Rapid Shutdown is initiated by turning off the PCS AC breaker (or otherwise losing AC power), or, for models with a DC Safety Unit, by turning off the DC switch, and that if the number of optimizers per string is not limited to 30 or fewer, the post-shutdown voltage will exceed 30 V and will not satisfy the NEC requirement[9]. The optimizer datasheet also notes that it complies with the NEC requirements for PVRSS (described below) and arc-fault protection, and that strings of 31 modules or more do not satisfy the 30 V requirement[9].

There is also a description that requires special attention in Japan. The company's documentation for Europe and APAC states that "there is currently no Rapid Shutdown standard in Europe and APAC," and explains that SafeDC is a function that lowers DC voltage to a safe level within up to 5 minutes when the grid stops, while compliance with the 30-second requirement of NEC 2017 applies only to specific models and settings[9]. In other words, "SafeDC installed" does not mean "30 V in 30 seconds"; the time to reach that level varies by model and configuration. When discussing the effect of SafeDC in Japanese installations, it is necessary to confirm the time to reach that level for the specific equipment.

"1V" is not "0V"

SafeDC's 1 V also has prerequisites. The company's documentation explains that the optimizer output at shutdown is nominally 1 V, with measured values in the range of 0.8 to 1.2 V; that the conditions for entering safe mode include PCS shutdown, AC loss, and string disconnection, as well as the optimizer temperature sensor exceeding 85°C; and that it takes 3 to 5 minutes for the capacitors inside the PCS to discharge and the unit to indicate "safe"[9]. In addition, the installation guide gives the worst-case value under fault conditions as the formula "maximum open-circuit voltage of the module + (number of modules in the string − 1) × 1 V" and requires the design to keep this below 120 V[9]. In other words, safety is designed on the assumption that if one optimizer fails, the voltage of that one module will appear in the string. The "failure of safety equipment" described in Section 16 is already incorporated into this formula.

SolarEdge is not the only method

SafeDC is one promising implementation, but it is not the only method. As noted in the previous section, there are multiple certified PVRSS methods, including dedicated RSDs, other companies' optimizers, microinverters, and string-level disconnect units. The choice of method is determined by trade-offs among roof shading conditions, monitoring granularity, number of components, maintenance structure, and cost, and the safety requirement should be evaluated not by which method is used but by how many volts remain after shutdown.

9. PVRSE and PVRSS

North American equipment certification standard UL 1741 (inverters, converters, controllers, etc.) includes two terms related to Rapid Shutdown.

  • PVRSE (Photovoltaic Rapid Shutdown Equipment): individual devices that perform the rapid shutdown function. Optimizers, RSDs, PCS units with transmitters, and so on.
  • PVRSS (Photovoltaic Rapid Shutdown System): a system in which specific PVRSE are configured in a specific combination, and the entire sequence from the initiating device to voltage reduction is evaluated as one unit.

What matters is the certification concept. It is not enough to attach parts labeled as Rapid Shutdown compatible; what is certified is that the combination of the PCS, module-side devices, and initiating device satisfies the requirements as a system. In UL product categories, PVRSE is distinguished as "QIJW" and PVRSS as "QIJS," and for QIJW devices it is explicitly stated that "the operation of a complete rapid shutdown system composed of this device has not been determined as part of the certification." Only QIJS is evaluated as a system[8]. Even if one company's optimizer is PVRSE on its own, if the configuration that combines it with another company's PCS has not been evaluated as PVRSS, system-level compliance cannot be demonstrated. The UL 1741 requirements for rapid shutdown were incorporated into the body of the standard in the second edition revision issued on December 22, 2017, and the third edition issued on September 28, 2021 also explicitly includes "rapid shutdown equipment and systems" in its scope[8].

The relationship with communication standards is the same. The SunSpec Rapid Shutdown signal described in the previous section is a specification for interoperability, and UL itself explains that "SunSpec certification alone does not satisfy the listing requirement of NEC 690.12 and is not a substitute for UL 1741 rapid shutdown certification"[8]. The ability to communicate and the ability of the system to drop to the specified voltage within the specified time are evaluated separately.

This distinction between “certification of a standalone device” and “certification of a system” is also easily confused in discussions in Japan. Placing certified devices side by side is not the same as having the configuration at the site drop to the specified voltage after shutdown.

10. Another concept shown by UL 3741

UL 3741, "Standard for Photovoltaic Hazard Control," was first issued on December 8, 2020[7]. It is the standard referenced by 690.12(B)(2)(1) in NEC 2020 and later, and it is one of the compliance routes within the array boundary.

What makes this standard important is that it clearly states that "safety" does not necessarily mean lowering every module to low voltage. The purpose of the standard is to keep the electric shock hazard from damaged solar equipment to a "reduced level" for firefighters responding to building fires, and the subject of evaluation is not individual equipment but the combination of components, devices, and systems that make up the array. The scope of the standard evaluates exposure to DC current on the assumption of firefighters' protective equipment, human body resistance, the tools used, extinguishing agents, and defined interactions (water spray, openings, movement, etc.), and excludes damage from direct flames, high-pressure water spray, building collapse, and similar conditions[7].

For this reason, a concept called "Hazard Control" can be established by combining the following elements.

  • Equipment placement (where to place conductive parts that may be contacted)
  • Array layout and mounting structure (integrated evaluation of modules, mounting structure, and wiring)
  • Wiring route and wiring method (eliminate exposed wiring, enclose in protective conduit)
  • Access distance (clearance from grounded metal parts)
  • Possibility of approaching hazardous parts (whether they can be touched during normal firefighting operations)
  • Electrical control (linked to Rapid Shutdown activation when necessary)

The scope of the standard explicitly states that "even after operating the required hazard-control initiation function, some array equipment may still have energized circuits" [7]. An explanation by the U.S. Association of Electrical Inspectors (IAEI) says that under UL 3741, configurations in which firefighters may come into contact with around 160V or more were also considered during the standard-setting process and are permitted [3]. A UL 3741-compliant system may or may not also satisfy the 30V/30-second requirement outside the array boundary; if it does not, it must separately satisfy the 30V requirement [7].

It is incorrect to oversimplify Rapid Shutdown and UL 3741 as two opposing philosophies. Both are different safety design and compliance routes for the same requirement, NEC 690.12. The former defines safety by voltage value, while the latter defines it by whether people enter dangerous current paths. The background to UL 3741 was the cost and reliability challenges of approaches that add electronics to each module, and it is more accurate to understand it as providing a path that controls contact with hazards without increasing equipment.

The essence of North American regulations—the question has changed

Rather than ending here with a list of standard numbers, we will extract the underlying thinking. What changed in more than 10 years of revisions in North America was the very "question" asked when safety is examined.

The earlier question was whether the PCS had been stopped or the disconnect switch opened. It was a question about the operating state of the equipment. The current question is "whether hazardous voltage remains in places that firefighters or workers may access". It is a question about the state of the system, including people’s positions and contact conditions.

This is a shift from equipment-centered safety (is this device certified, was this operation performed) to system safety that considers the possibility of human contact (30 seconds after this operation, how many volts are present here, can a person touch it). The changes in each edition of NEC 690.12, PVRSS system certification, and UL 3741's interaction-based evaluation can all be read as expressions of this shift.

11. What remains when PV in Japan is shut down

Consider a configuration that is common in Japan.

  PVモジュール(屋根)
      ↓  ストリング配線(数百V DC)
  接続箱(ストリングを並列、開閉器・ヒューズ・逆流防止)
      ↓  幹線DC配線(屋根→壁面→地上/屋内)
  PCS(DC入力開閉器を内蔵する機種が多い)
      ↓
  AC → 分電盤 → 系統

What happens to each section when the PCS is shut down?

SectionPCS stop onlyAlso open the disconnect switch in the junction boxOnly the DC disconnect switch built into the PCS is opened
Modules to junction box (string)Open-circuit voltage remains (several hundred V)Open-circuit voltage remains (several hundred V)Open-circuit voltage remains (several hundred V)
Combiner box to PCS (main line)Open-circuit voltage remains (several hundred V)It becomes de-energized (only downstream of the junction box)Open-circuit voltage remains (the switch is inside the PCS, so everything upstream is live)
DC input stage inside the PCSCharge remains in the capacitor (discharge takes several minutes)Charge remains in the capacitorCharge remains in the capacitor
AC sideNo voltage (if there is no power supply from the grid side)No voltageNo voltage

What is often overlooked here is the DC switch built into the PCS. Even if you think you have turned off the DC, what is actually disconnected is only one point at the PCS input. All DC wiring upstream of the switch, that is, from the roof down the wall to the PCS, remains live. Even when a switch is installed in the junction box, only the section from the junction box to the PCS becomes de-energized, and the string on the roof and the wiring between modules retain open-circuit voltage.

In facilities where long DC wiring runs from the roof to the ground-level PCS—for example, a configuration in which a trunk line runs tens of meters from the roof of a large warehouse down to the ground-level PCS enclosure—this "section that remains live even after the PCS is stopped" passes through building walls, ceiling spaces, pits, and inside panels. If a fire damages the insulation along this path, metal parts that firefighters may touch could become energized. As for the input-stage capacitors of the PCS, an AIST guide introduces a note in domestic PCS manuals stating that after the breaker is opened, work on the DC side should wait 3 to 20 minutes [15].

12. Japanese laws, standards, and fire protection measures

It is not accurate to assume that "Japan has nothing." We organize the systems and materials that can be confirmed, by purpose.

Electricity Business Act, Technical Standards for Electrical Facilities, and Technical Interpretation of Electrical Equipment Standards

As electrical installations under the Electricity Business Act, solar PV facilities are installed in accordance with the Ministerial Ordinance on Technical Standards for Electrical Facilities and its interpretation. Solar cell power generation facilities with an output below 50 kW are classified as "small-scale power generation facilities" (of which those from 10 kW to under 50 kW have, since 2023, required notification of basic information and pre-use self-inspection as small-scale business electrical installations), and Article 200 of the interpretation sets out the installation method [14].

Paragraph 2 of Article 200 requires that, for solar cell power generation facilities that are small-scale power generation facilities, (i) live parts be installed so that they are not exposed, (ii) for the load-side circuit connected to the solar cell modules (or, in the case of multiple modules, the load-side circuit connected to the assembly of those modules), a switch or other similar device (limited to one that can switch load current) be installed close to the connection point, (iii) for circuits connecting modules in parallel, an overcurrent protection device or other device that protects the circuit in the event of a short circuit be installed (except where the circuit can withstand short-circuit current), and (iv) wiring be installed using either synthetic resin conduit, metal conduit, flexible metal conduit, or cable work [14].

What this article requires is a "switch" that disconnects the array side from the PCS side for maintenance, and short-circuit protection when connected in parallel. Even when the switch is opened, it is assumed that the circuit upstream of the switch (the module side) remains energized, and the article itself does not treat that as a problem. As far as can be confirmed, there is no performance requirement in the technical standards or their interpretation that says, "after a stop operation, DC wiring that people may touch must be brought below a certain voltage within a certain time." In a table comparing Germany (VDE-AR-E 2100-712), the United States (NEC 2014), and Japan, the AIST guide summarizes Japan as only requiring that the protection scope be "specified as necessary," that the system voltage after disconnection be limited to "a general electrical appliance standard of 45V under the Electrical Appliance and Material Safety Act," and that there be "no specification" for trigger and label requirements [15]. The same guide also introduces, as references for equipment selection, overseas examples such as "PCS with a discharge resistor circuit that can reduce residual voltage on the DC input capacitor to 30V or less within 10 seconds" and "products that can be de-energized at the module level" [15].

AIST guide to DC electrical safety

AIST's "Guide and Technical Information for DC Electrical Safety in Solar Power Generation (2nd edition, April 2019)" is not a law but a design and equipment-selection guideline; however, it is a Japanese-language source that systematically covers DC arcs, grounding methods, junction boxes, and firefighter protection measures (signage, module layout, rapid shutdown). In the rapid shutdown section, it states the purpose as "to prevent firefighter electric shock and the reignition of fires by de-energizing DC circuits," and as a design guideline says that "it is desirable to install a disconnecting device that can be shut off remotely directly beneath the solar array" [15].

NEDO Design and Construction Guidelines (2025 edition)

The "Design and Construction Guidelines for Ground-Mounted Solar Power Generation Systems" published by the New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization (NEDO) in 2025 add chapters on electrical design and construction to the 2019 edition, which focused mainly on foundations and structural design for mounting frames. In the section on circuit breakers and disconnectors, it states that means should be provided to interrupt circuits within the array from the string to the PCS for maintenance and inspection, that JIS C 62548:2023 requires a switch for each string, that opening a disconnector while current is flowing may cause an arc, that "solar cells are energized during daytime work," and that systems with an open-circuit voltage exceeding 30V may generate DC arcs. It further states that in the event of an electrical abnormality, disconnection at the junction box and stopping the PCS are necessary, and that "it is desirable to consider methods that can also be operated remotely," and "for protective measures for firefighters, UL 3741 Photovoltaic Hazard Control is a useful reference", explicitly citing the North American standard [22]. This is a recommendation rather than an obligation, but the fact that a Japanese public guideline has begun to describe post-shutdown DC-side handling as a design item is worth recording.

Materials from the Fire and Disaster Management Agency and the Tokyo Fire Department

The 2013 administrative notice from the Fire and Disaster Management Agency mentioned in Section 3 sets out protection measures and operational procedures for firefighters [11]. The Fire Research Institute published a technical report in March 2014 titled "Safety Measures in Solar Power System Fires and Firefighting Operations" [11]. Since October 2014, the Tokyo Fire Department has operated guidance standards for cases where solar power generation equipment is installed in buildings subject to the Fire Service Act Enforcement Order, Appendix 1. The content includes not installing modules or DC wiring within roughly 50 cm of emergency entrances, outdoor stairs, or alternative openings and their surroundings; securing firefighting access routes within 24 m of all modules in large-scale installations; and providing anti-electric-shock signage for equipment and DC wiring from the modules to the inverter, as well as at entrances and other points along firefighters' access routes where they may approach such equipment [12].

This is a noteworthy point. The Tokyo Fire Department's guidance standard does not require lowering voltage, but rather controls risk through equipment placement and labeling: do not place modules or DC wiring in areas where firefighters will operate, and indicate hazardous parts. In concept it includes elements similar to UL 3741's control of contact possibility. However, there is no linkage with electrical control, the scope is fire protection objects and does not include ordinary residences, and it remains only a Tokyo Fire Department guidance standard.

Industry voluntary rule (labeling)

In response to the Tokyo Fire Department's guidance standards, the Japan Photovoltaic Energy Association (JPEA) issued a notice in September 2014 on layout and signage for public and industrial facilities, and in August 2016 established a voluntary rule on signage for the DC wiring section of residential solar power systems. The latter states as its background that "the DC side of a solar power system continues to generate voltage as long as there is sunlight, even if the grid-side power is cut off," and clearly notes that the National Association of Fire Chiefs had requested identification markings on DC wiring because of the risk of electric shock during firefighting and post-extinguishment handling. Its content is to use cables with identification lines for DC wiring from the modules to the junction box, or to attach tags such as "solar," "PV," or "solar power" at intervals where they can be seen [18]. This is not a legal obligation but an industry voluntary rule, and it records how Japan's own industry has addressed the fact that "even if AC is cut, DC remains live" through signage.

Alert regarding damaged equipment

The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry issued a "Request for Prevention of Electric Shock from Flooded Solar Cell Power Generation Facilities" during the 2017 Akita heavy rain and the 2018 Western Japan heavy rain, calling attention to the fact that even flooded or damaged facilities generate power if exposed to light, that people should not approach them while inundated, that rubber gloves and rubber boots should be used to prevent electric shock when handling modules that have drifted or washed ashore, and that even after the water recedes, moisture may remain inside the collector box and PCS, creating a risk of electric shock and fire [18]. Based on flood experiments, JPEA also issued a cautionary document stating that even during flooding, if exposed to light, the system can generate "300V or more," that after the water recedes the ground insulation of the collector box and PCS remains degraded, and that, as an anti-electric-shock measure, specialists should be asked to "disconnect the solar panels from the junction box" [18]. All of these show the current situation in which there is no means on the equipment side to reduce voltage during a disaster, and safety depends on keeping people away and on disconnection by specialists.

Report by the Consumer Safety Investigation Commission

In January 2019, the Consumer Safety Investigation Commission of the Consumer Affairs Agency published an investigation report on fire accidents and other incidents involving residential solar power systems. From March 2008 to November 2017, 127 cases of fire, ignition, smoke generation, and similar incidents were registered in the accident information database; of the 72 cases investigated, 13 originated from modules or cables, and 59 from inverters or junction boxes. Cable fires were often caused by installation defects such as pinching under modules or improper intermediate connections, and on roofs without steel sheets or similar materials, the report pointed out the possibility of fire spreading to roofing felt and sheathing boards. At the time of the report, the cumulative number of residential installations was about 2.37 million buildings, of which about 4.5% (about 107,000 buildings) were roofs without steel sheets or similar materials, and the questionnaire showed that about 70% of owners did not perform maintenance inspections [16]. NITE's analysis also shows that a high proportion of junction box accidents were due to installation defects such as wiring connection mistakes, and it summarizes that about 200 solar power generation equipment accidents were reported over the 10 years from fiscal 2014 to fiscal 2023, of which about 70% involved PCS and just under 20% involved modules. In an August 2025 alert, NITE called for the prevention of secondary damage such as electric shock from damaged or flooded modules and broken cables, and reminded that even equipment under 10 kW is subject to the obligation to comply with technical standards [17].

JIS, JET, and industry guidelines

The array design standard JIS C 62548:2023 (established in January 2023 and adopted with modifications based on IEC 62548:2016) sets design requirements for wiring, electrical protective devices, switches, and grounding for DC arrays with a standard array open-circuit voltage of 30 V or more and 750 V or less, and also requires switches for each string, but it does not include performance requirements for post-shutdown voltage or time for firefighting purposes[22]. For DC arcs, JIS C 63027, "Solar photovoltaic power systems—DC arc detection and interruption," based on IEC 63027:2023, was established on November 20, 2025, and standardized performance and test conditions for detection (or detection and interruption) within 2.5 seconds after arc occurrence or before the released energy reaches 750 J[22]. However, this is a standard for performance evaluation, and no system requiring installation in PCS or junction boxes can be confirmed. Module safety is covered by the JIS C 8992 series, and grid interconnection protection for PCS is handled by JET certification; both are evaluations of the equipment itself, and the certification items do not include functions equivalent to rapid shutdown[22]. The JEMA and JPEA maintenance and inspection guidelines state in the lockout/tagout section that "because solar modules generate power when exposed to sunlight, it cannot be said that there is no equipment that remains energized even after disconnection," and they show a procedure for confirming de-energization with a voltage tester[18].

13. Comparison with North America

The measures available in Japan and the requirements of NEC 690.12 in North America differ in both purpose and level of requirement. Let's compare them side by side.

PerspectiveNorth America (NEC 690.12, UL 1741, UL 3741)Japan (interpretation of electrical technical standards, fire department materials, and guidelines)
PurposeClearly reduce the risk of electric shock to firefighters (first responders)The Electrical Equipment Technical Standards Interpretation concerns the safety of electrical installations. Fire service materials concern crew operations and protection
Performance requirements30V/30 seconds outside the boundary, 80V/30 seconds or PVHCS inside the boundaryNo post-stop voltage or time requirement (AIST summary: "no specification")
ScopeSolar circuits on or in buildings (ground-mounted systems excluded; carports and similar structures also excluded from 2023)The Electrical Equipment Technical Standards Interpretation applies to all electrical installations. The Tokyo Fire Department guidance standards apply only to fire protection objects
MeansElectrical control near the module (PVRSS) or control of layout, wiring, and contact conditions (UL 3741)Installation of switches, construction methods, labeling, placement (Tokyo), crew protective equipment and water discharge methods
certificationCertification as a system (PVRSS), certification as an array (PVHCS)Certification of individual equipment (JIS, JET)
Legal constraintsMandatory in the states and municipalities that adopted itThe Electrical Equipment Technical Standards Interpretation is mandatory. Fire service materials and AIST guidance are guidelines and notices

Japan's system is composed of three pillars: "install a disconnecting device," "protect personnel," and "display the hazard." All are meaningful measures, but none defines the physical result of how many volts remain in the wiring from the roof to the PCS after the stop operation. That is the core difference from North America.

This difference is closer to "North America and the rest" than to "North America and Japan." Germany's VDE application rule VDE-AR-E 2100-712 (first issued in 2013, revised in 2018) assumes that modules continue to generate voltage even when the AC side is disconnected during firefighting, and defines DC-side measures to reduce the probability of electric shock to firefighters as "supplementary recommendations"; a fire switch (Feuerwehrschalter) is one of those options. IEC 60364-7-712:2017 requires a DC switch-disconnector for isolating the PCS on each array, but it does not have a rapid shutdown requirement for firefighters[24]. SolarEdge's statement in materials for Europe and APAC that there is "no standard for Rapid Shutdown" refers to this situation[9]. The accurate position is not that Japan is "behind," but that, as a legal requirement, post-shutdown voltage has so far been defined only in North America.

14. Remaining issues in Japan

We examine, by scenario, what issues remain when there is no requirement to manage the DC voltage after shutdown.

Firefighting

Even if AC is cut off during a fire, live DC may remain from the roof to the wall and to the PCS. Fire departments respond on the assumption of this risk by using spray water, insulated gloves, and avoiding inadvertent contact, but this is a structure that relies on personnel protection, and there is no means provided on the equipment side to reduce the hazard. At night or in smoke, it is also difficult to determine on site where the DC wiring runs.

Maintenance

Even after the PCS is shut down, inspectors must treat the module-side wiring as energized. Work on junction boxes during the day, unplugging and reconnecting connectors, and preparations for insulation resistance measurements all follow procedures that assume an energized state. Article 339 of the Industrial Safety and Health Regulations requires, for de-energized work, lockout/tagout of the switch used to open the circuit, discharge of residual charge, and confirmation of de-energization by voltage testing, but on the DC side of solar power, even when the circuit is opened, the module side remains energized as long as there is sunlight, and there is always a section that cannot be treated as de-energized work[22]. The system does not close off the possibility that inexperienced workers may mistakenly think, "It is safe because the PCS is off."

Construction

Cable pinching, connector incompatibility or poor fastening, and incorrect polarity wiring are also cited as major causes of fires in reports by the Consumer Safety Investigation Commission[16]. These are not visible at the time of installation and appear years later as DC arcs. If the only way to stop an arc is to shut down the PCS, then the arc on the roof will not stop.

Disaster

If DC cables are damaged by an earthquake, typhoon, flood, or building collapse, the damaged section remains energized as long as there is sunlight. The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and JPEA's warnings regarding disaster-affected equipment repeatedly call for the fact that it may continue generating power even after submersion, for people not to approach it, and for specialists to be asked to disconnect the modules and junction boxes[18]. The first thing recovery workers and residents come into contact with is not the PCS, but scattered modules and wiring. In a structure where a person must perform the "disconnection" on site, the danger is left in place until the water recedes or a specialist arrives.

Dismantling and removal

Workers who do not know the structure of the facility—demolition contractors, roofing contractors, renovation contractors—will increasingly go up onto roofs and come into contact with solar wiring. Dismantling solar systems requires electrical work knowledge, but the mechanism to guarantee that is limited. There is a possibility that workers will proceed without knowing that a handover stating "the breaker has been turned off" does not mean the DC side is safe.

Used, long-term operation

Solar PV systems are used for 20 to 30 years or more. Cable insulation, waterproof gaskets in connectors, terminals inside junction boxes, and module back sheets deteriorate over time, and insulation resistance declines. Even in systems that had no problems at installation, the combination of insulation deterioration and high DC voltage increases the probability of ground faults and arcs over time. If there is no means to reduce the voltage after shutdown, this probability remains for the full service life of the system.

15. The even larger issue of existing PV

Japan has solar power generation facilities that were introduced in large numbers during the FIT period (which began in 2012). According to the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy's business plan certification information (as of the end of December 2025), the number of certified residential systems (under 10 kW) is about 2.54 million for newly certified systems and about 1.2 million for systems transferred from before the start of FIT, while non-residential systems (10 kW or more) total about 700,000. Small-scale business systems from 10 kW to under 50 kW account for about 30% of the total on a capacity basis[23]. For residential systems, the expiration of the feed-in tariff period (the so-called post-FIT) reached about 530,000 cases in November to December 2019 alone, and by 2023 the cumulative total had reached about 1.65 million cases and 6.7 million kW, meaning that equipment installed more than 10 years ago now forms the core of the population[23]. Many of these meet multiple of the following conditions.

  • No function equivalent to Rapid Shutdown
  • The string is long (many modules in series), and the voltage after shutdown is high
  • The DC wiring from the roof or rack to the PCS is long
  • The equipment is more than 10 years old, and cables, connectors, and junction boxes have deteriorated
  • The contractor has gone out of business or withdrawn, and the installation records cannot be traced
  • Single-line diagrams and string wiring diagrams have been lost
  • Ownership has changed, and the current owner does not understand the equipment configuration
  • Only the PCS has been replaced with a used product or a different manufacturer's product
  • During repowering, old and new equipment are mixed together

When fire or disaster occurs at a facility with these overlapping elements, neither firefighters nor recovery workers have a way on site to know where the DC wiring runs and where it can be disconnected. Imposing a post-stop voltage requirement on new installations does not solve this problem. Existing installations remain outside the scope of the system and will stay on rooftops for the next 20 years.

Practical options for existing equipment

For existing equipment, we will organize practical measures that can be taken, separate from whether they are mandatory.

  • RSD retrofit: Add dedicated RSDs to existing strings. This requires a PCS or transmitter combination and involves rooftop work and rewiring.
  • Response when updating the PCS: When replacing the PCS at the end of its service life (10 to 15 years), introduce a PCS with transmission functions and module-side devices at the same time. This is more efficient than a standalone retrofit.
  • Response during repowering: When there is an opportunity to replace modules, PCS, and wiring, design post-shutdown voltage to include MLPE and string design (shortening the number of modules in series).
  • Signage: Expand signage for DC wiring, junction boxes, PCS, and entrances along access routes, as set out in the Tokyo Fire Department's guidance standards, to include residences.
  • Equipment information for fire services: Post the single-line diagram, isolation points, and DC wiring routes near the PCS or near the distribution board, and if possible register them as advance information for fire departments.
  • Signage for DC wiring routes: Display the routes of DC wiring in walls, ceilings, and pits on the building side so that they can be avoided during opening or demolition work.

The latter three are not electrical safety measures, but they are low-cost, applicable to many existing installations, and are measures in the same direction as UL 3741’s “control of contactability.” Electrical safety measures are realistically incorporated at lifecycle milestones such as inverter replacement or repowering.

16. Rapid Shutdown also has drawbacks

We have discussed the significance of Rapid Shutdown up to this point, but it should not be praised unconditionally. If electronic devices (MLPE/RSD) are added to each module, the following problems arise.

  • Increase in number of components: The same number as the modules, or a number close to it, of electronic devices are installed on the roof.
  • Environmental load on rooftop electronic devices: They are exposed to high temperatures, humidity, ultraviolet radiation, and temperature cycles. They are expected to operate for more than 20 years in an environment harsher than that of a PCS.
  • Increase in connectors: The number of connector connection points per module doubles. Connectors are among the leading causes of fires.
  • Increase in failure points: As the number of devices increases, the total number of failures also increases. Whether a failure in one unit is limited to stopping power generation or leads to loss of safety functions depends on the design.
  • Dependence on installation quality: If the fastening of the equipment, connector compatibility, and communication settings are not correct, the safety functions will not operate as expected.
  • Communication failures: In systems that use power line communication, noise and wiring length can make communication unstable, leading to false shutdowns or reduced power generation.
  • Replacement work: When rooftop equipment fails, work is required to remove and replace the module, and that work itself becomes work at height and on live equipment.
  • Long-term reliability: For early products, the failure rate after 20 years is still not sufficiently proven.
  • Cost: Equipment costs and installation costs increase. In markets such as Japan, where power generation cost per roof area is a key factor, this becomes a barrier to adoption.

Therefore, it is not a simple matter of saying that adding safety equipment makes the system safe. It is necessary to manage through design and maintenance whether a failure of the added equipment only stops power generation, causes loss of safety function, or becomes a new ignition source. The reason a concept such as UL 3741 emerged, which controls contact with hazards inside the array through placement, wiring, and contact conditions without adding equipment, is this reality. As stated in Section 10, the two are not in conflict but are two paths depending on conditions.

17. Risk comparison by system type

We compare six representative methods under the same items. We do not rank them simply; we show the trade-offs.

ItemA Conventional string PCSB String PCS with DC switchSystem with C RSDD Optimizer method (SolarEdge, etc.)E MicroinverterF UL 3741 type Hazard Control
Normal operationSimple, high efficiencySame as AAlmost the same as A (RSD losses are small)Module-level MPPT, strong against shadingModule-level MPPT, AC collectionAdd placement and wiring constraints to Method A or other methods
DC voltage when PCS is stoppedString open-circuit voltage (several hundred V) remains throughout the entire sectionOnly downstream of the switch is de-energized. Upstream remains at several hundred voltsDownstream of the RSD is below the specified value. Between the modules and the RSD, it is one to two modulesString ≈ number of modules × 1V. Between the module and the optimizer, it is one moduleThere is no high-voltage DC string. Between the module and the microinverter, it is one module's worthVoltage depends on the system. Risk is controlled by isolating it from places where contact may occur
Firefighting operationsFrom the roof to the PCS, live work is assumedThe main line to the PCS may be disconnected in some cases. The rooftop remains liveAfter 30 seconds, the main line is low voltage. The rooftop is low voltageEquivalent to C (time to reach depends on the model and settings)DC hazards are minimized. AC wiring is the same as ordinary building wiringReduce conductive parts that can be touched. Alignment with firefighters' procedures is a prerequisite
Maintenance safetyAlways live workThe main line side can be worked on with the power off. The roof side is liveWork can be performed at low voltage after shutdown (inspection of the RSD itself is separate)After shutdown, low voltage. The number of modules can be confirmed by voltageOn the DC side, only one moduleElectrically, it may be the same as method A
fault pointMinimum少Increases in proportion to the number of modulesIncreases in proportion to the number of modules (can be identified by monitoring)Increases in proportion to the number of modules (can be identified by monitoring)It may be possible to avoid adding electronic equipment
Construction complexity低低Medium (RSD installation and communication check)Middle (optimizer installation and pairing)Medium to high (AC collection and grounding)Medium (compliance with layout, separation, and wiring methods)
Long-term reliabilityLong track recordLong track recordTwenty years of experience with rooftop electronics is still aheadSame as above (track record beyond 10 years is increasing)Same as leftPassive measures are less likely to deteriorate, but may be undermined by modifications
CostMinimum低中Medium to high高Design and certification costs. Equipment costs can be kept down
Introduction to existing equipment—Adding a disconnect switch is relatively easyCan be retrofitted (PCS compatibility and rooftop work required)It is realistic to do it at the same time as PCS replacementClose to a full replacementReconfiguration is difficult. Display and wiring protection are only partially possible
If the safety function itself failsNo safety function (always energized)It may not be possible to disconnect due to switch stickingIf signal loss means stop in a fail-safe design, it is on the safe side. If the device shorts, voltage remainsSame as left. Optimizer failures appear in the string voltage and can be detected by monitoringA single fault stops the affected modulePassive measures are less likely to "fail," but renovations and expansions can undermine the assumptions

As the table shows, the method that minimizes post-shutdown voltage the most, E, is heavy in cost and installation, while the simplest method, A, leaves the entire section live even after shutdown. Intermediate methods, C and D, reduce post-shutdown voltage, but depend on electronics and communication on the roof. Method F avoids adding electronics, but voltage remains and design and retrofit management are prerequisites. The choice is not which one is correct, but who can touch where in that system, at what milestone it can be introduced, and who will maintain it.

18. Does Japan need a copy of U.S. standards?

The conclusion is not that Japan should mandate exactly the same NEC approach as the United States. The premises differ between Japan and North America.

  • Residential structure: Japanese residential roofs are often pitched roofs, and the modules are in close contact with the roof surface, so the conditions for personnel working on the roof differ from those of North American wood-frame houses.
  • System scale: Residential systems are mainly around 4 to 6 kW, with about 10 modules in series. Industrial rooftop systems range widely from several hundred kW to several MW.
  • Firefighting operations: Japanese fire departments already have operational procedures premised on live DC equipment, and they respond with spray water and protective gear.
  • Construction method: Roof-integrated, steel-sheet attached, and other types have diverse wiring conditions under the modules.
  • Disaster characteristics: Earthquakes, typhoons, and floods occur frequently, and the share of damage scenarios other than fire is large.
  • Large existing PV stock: New installation regulations alone do not reach most of the population.
  • Cost and equipment lifespan: For equipment after FIT, the feed-in tariff is lower, and there is little room for additional investment.

Based on these points, it may be acceptable for requirements to differ by installation type.

Installation formA place that people access in an emergencyDirection of requirements considered reasonable
New residential PVOn the roof, in the attic, on walls, and around the PCSAfter shutdown, the voltage between the roof and the PCS is reduced to a specified value or below within a certain time (electrical control). Because this is a new installation, the additional cost is minimal
Existing residential PVSame as aboveElectrical control when updating the PCS. Until then, labeling, clear indication of isolation points, and organization of equipment information
Industrial rooftopOn the roof, indoor main cable routes, and the electrical roomLower the voltage of main line routes or protect and label the routes. Separation from firefighting access routes (nationwide adoption of Tokyo Fire Department standards)
Ground-mounted PVOn site (responders and restoration workers)The context of building fires is thin. Warning signs prohibiting approach during disasters, clear indication of isolation points, and procedures after flooding. NEC also excludes ground-mounted systems
Carport PVPeople and vehicles are constantly directly belowIsolation of conductive parts that may be touched and protection of wiring. NEC 2023 excludes non-enclosed independent structures, but there is room for separate consideration in Japan's installation density
All existing equipmentThe unknown wiring path itselfPrioritize drawings, isolation points, wiring route labeling, and information registration. Electrical control at the time of repowering

What matters is not mandating a specific method, but defining as a performance requirement how far, within how many seconds, and in what way the DC voltage at places people access in an emergency should be made safe. If it is a performance requirement, then you can choose optimizers, RSD, microinverters, or hazard control through layout and wiring, as long as the requirement is met. This is the form North America reached over 10 years, and what should be copied is not the numerical values in the regulations, but the way the question is framed.

19. Define a "safe state" rather than "stop"

The conclusion of this article is not a comparison of Japan and the United States in terms of superiority. What should be asked is not "which equipment is installed," but "whether the PV system can truly be brought into a safe state during accidents, fires, maintenance, and disasters".

For Japan's system and industry practices as well, evaluation should be based not on whether rules exist, but on the physical result of how actually dangerous DC voltage is managed. From that perspective, Japan has switch installation obligations, installation method provisions, fire service operational procedures, Tokyo Fire Department placement and labeling standards, and AIST design guidelines, all of which were created with awareness of DC hazards. At the same time, there is nothing that specifies what voltage the wiring from the roof to the PCS is 30 seconds after a shutdown operation, and the result differs by system; in many existing systems it remains at several hundred volts.

I-S3 recommends configurations in which DC voltage drops after shutdown for solar PV in buildings where people work, and has made SolarEdge's SafeDC a standard option. That is not because its products are the only ones, but because it is a configuration whose post-shutdown voltage can be confirmed with a voltmeter. Whatever the method, at handover and during inspection, we consider it part of the equipment to record the measured voltage at each point on the roof, at the junction box, and at the PCS input after the shutdown operation, and to leave that value and the isolation point in a form readable by the fire service and the next owner.

20. Conclusion—30 seconds after pressing the emergency stop button

“Was the emergency stop button pressed?” is a confirmation of operation. “Thirty seconds after that operation, what voltage remains where from the roof to the PCS?” is a confirmation of state. What is needed when evaluating the safety of a solar PV system is the latter.

Rather than the name of the equipment or the operating procedure, decide during design what physical state each point of the facility should be in during an emergency, measure it at completion, confirm it during inspection, and make it possible to communicate it in an emergency. If you start from the simple fact that solar PV does not stop just because the PCS is stopped, you will understand that this series of tasks is what is needed. On your roof, 30 seconds after stopping the PCS, how many volts remain?

Frequently Asked Questions

If the inverter is stopped, does the solar PV system become de-energized?

It does not. As long as there is sunlight, the modules continue to produce open-circuit voltage, and the wiring from the modules to the PCS DC input retains the voltage corresponding to the number of modules in series. Stopping the PCS means stopping AC output; it does not make the DC side safe.

Are Rapid Shutdown and SolarEdge SafeDC the same thing?

No. Rapid Shutdown is a regulatory performance requirement defined by NEC 690.12. SafeDC is SolarEdge's feature name, which lowers the output of each optimizer to about 1V when stopped. A configuration including SafeDC can be certified as PVRSS and may comply with NEC requirements if installation conditions are met (such as no more than 30 modules per string), but the name and the regulation are separate concepts.

Is there a requirement in Japan equivalent to Rapid Shutdown?

Not within the confirmed scope. Article 200 of the Electrical Equipment Technical Standards Interpretation requires disconnecting devices, overcurrent protection devices, and installation methods, but it does not require DC voltage and time after stopping, and the AIST guide also organizes the starting conditions and display as "no provision" and the protection scope as "needs to be specified." The 2025 NEDO design and construction guideline cites UL 3741 as a reference for firefighter protection, but that is a recommendation level.

Is UL 3741 an alternative to Rapid Shutdown?

They are not opposing concepts. UL 3741 is a standard that evaluates shock hazards within the array boundary through a combination of layout, wiring, and electrical control, and it is one of the compliance routes under NEC 690.12(B)(2). The 30V/30-second requirement outside the boundary must be satisfied separately.

Can safety measures be added later to an existing solar power generation system?

There are ways. Incorporate MLPE or RSD when updating the PCS or during repowering, install remotely operable DC disconnectors directly beneath the array, and improve labeling of the DC wiring route and disconnect points as well as equipment information. Practical options change depending on the wiring configuration and whether drawings are available.

Can Rapid Shutdown be achieved with parallel inverters only?

This must not be assumed. Even with multiple PCS / multiple MPPTs, the path that reduces conductors outside the array boundary to the specified voltage within the specified time is drawn on the drawings as a listed PVRSS combination of initiator, transmitter, and each PCS. We do not assume that stopping one PCS has made all parallel strings safe.

Note: Example of manufacturer fault indication (Tigo EI code 204)

This discussion is not about a specific manufacturer. However, fault tables from manufacturers include codes indicating "DC disconnection function abnormality," and as one example, we cite code 204, "Disconnect function abnormal," in the Tigo EI inverter for the U.S. market[26]. The guidance is system shutdown → check the disconnect wiring → if it does not clear, contact manufacturer support. This is a warning that the safety function cannot be relied on, and, as in Section 1, it does not mean the array became de-energized during the alarm.

Confirmation sequence for code 204 (follow the manufacturer’s documentation)

The sources are Tigo's fault code table and the EI Inverter Manual[26]. Do not let unqualified persons touch DC wiring.

  1. Record the fault code shown on the inverter's LED or app, and whether power generation has stopped (204).
  2. The shutdown sequence is battery storage (if any) → DC disconnect switch at the bottom of the inverter → AC disconnect. Wait at least 5 minutes before opening the wiring box.
  3. A licensed electrician inspects the DC disconnect switch body, wiring, and terminals, then restarts it. If it does not clear, contact Tigo support.
  4. If contact cleaning for the rotary DC disconnect switch, turning it ON→OFF five times once a year, has not been carried out, do it during this inspection.
  5. Do not assume the module, homerun, or junction box is de-energized. After switching it off, test for voltage before touching it.

Organize from the materials how many volts remain after shutdown of existing equipment

If you have materials that show the PCS model, the number of series-connected strings, the location of the combiner box, and the route of the DC wiring (single-line diagram, layout drawing, inspection records), we can organize in chat the expected voltage remaining in each section after the stop operation and the safety options available when replacing the PCS or during repowering. Formal design comes after on-site confirmation.

Organize in chat

Related pages

They are arranged in the order of the first part, case studies, and technical materials.

Main reference materials

Each document was checked against the publicly available URL as of September 2026. NEC text differs by edition, and adoption timing varies by state and municipality. The dates of enactment and revision are listed for laws and standards.

  1. Rapid Shutdown of PV Systems/IAEI Magazine (International Association of Electrical Inspectors)/January-February 2015/iaeimagazine.orgFull text of NEC 2014 690.12 (5 ft/10 ft, 30 V/240 VA/10 seconds), background of the CMP-4 firefighter safety task group, and the basis for considering 30 V contact-safe in wet environments.
  2. NFPA Issues Three TIAs Related to 2014 NEC/EC&M (Electrical Construction & Maintenance)/2016/ecmweb.com;UL Question Corner — PV Rapid Shutdown/IAEI Magazine/iaeimagazine.orgThat TIA 14-10 (August 2016) revised the “10 seconds” in 690.12(2) to “30 seconds,” and the reason for the change (alignment with requirements to continue operating during grid disturbances).
  3. NEC Rapid Shutdown Requirements and UL 3741/IAEI Magazine/iaeimagazine.orgChanges in the text of NEC 2017, 2020, and 2023 690.12(B) (array boundary 305 mm, 30 V/30 seconds outside the boundary, 80 V/30 seconds inside the boundary, PVHCS, deletion of former (3)), that contact at around 160 V is already considered under UL 3741, and reference notes for PVRSE and PVHCE.
  4. 2023 National Electrical Code and Photovoltaic Power Systems/IAEI Magazine/iaeimagazine.orgException 2 in NEC 2023 (non-enclosed independent structures) and the relocation of the marking requirement from 690.56(C) to 690.12(D).
  5. 690.12 Rapid Shutdown of PV Systems on Buildings (2026 NEC Code Change Summary)/Electrical License Renewal (NEC continuing education material)/2026/electricallicenserenewal.com;NFPA 70-2026 Tentative Interim Amendment 26-2 (690.12(C))/NFPA/Issued August 20, 2025, effective September 9/docinfofiles.nfpa.org (PDF);NFPA Standards Council Final Minutes, August 2025/NFPA/content.nfpa.org (PDF)Reorganization of 690.12(B)(C) in NEC 2026, clarification of the types of initiating devices, allowance of E-stop-type switches, and unchanged performance requirements (secondary source). NFPA 70-2026 publication date (August 20, 2025) and effective date (September 9), and the TIA 26-2 rule requiring outdoor installation of initiating devices for one- and two-family dwellings (primary source).
  6. NEC Enforcement Maps (Learn where the NEC is enforced)/NFPA (National Fire Protection Association)/Updated August 3, 2026/nfpa.org;PV Rapid Shutdown Advisory Memo/Connecticut Office of State Building Inspector/December 2018/portal.ct.gov (PDF)A list of the NEC editions and effective dates enforced by state. As of August 2026: 6 states on the 2026 edition, 20 states on the 2023 edition, 15 states on the 2020 edition, 3 states on the 2017 edition, and 2 states on the 2008 edition, plus examples of city-specific adoption such as Chicago and New York City. An example of Connecticut excluding 690.12(B)(2) by state amendment when adopting the 2017 edition.
  7. ANSI/CAN/UL 3741 Standard for Photovoltaic Hazard Control/UL Standards & Engagement/First edition December 8, 2020 (revised October 2025)/shopulstandards.com;Addressing Potential Firefighting Hazards Around Photovoltaic Systems/UL Standards & Engagement/December 2020/ulse.orgPublication date of the standard, scope (assuming firefighter protective equipment, human resistance, tools, extinguishing agents, and defined interactions; direct flame, high-pressure water streams, and collapse are outside scope), that some energized circuits may remain in equipment after initiation, the relationship to the 30 V requirement outside the boundary, and that it is based on UL research in 2011 and joint research with Sandia.
  8. UL Question Corner: PV Rapid Shutdown Inside the Array (published in the September-October 2019 issue of IAEI Magazine)/UL LLC (Code Authorities)/2019/code-authorities.ul.com (PDF);The Code Authority: Photovoltaic Rapid Shutdown Systems/UL LLC/Issue 1, 2015/code-authorities.ul.com (PDF);UL 1741 Third Edition/UL Standards & Engagement/Published September 28, 2021/shopulstandards.comThe December 22, 2017 revision of UL 1741 Second Edition added rapid shutdown device and system requirements to the body of the standard, the distinction between product categories QIJW (PVRSE: equipment) and QIJS (PVRSS: system), that QIJW equipment alone does not establish system operation, that SunSpec certification is not a substitute for UL 1741 rapid shutdown certification, and that rapid shutdown devices and systems are included in scope 1.6 of the Third Edition.
  9. Isc and Voc in SolarEdge Systems — Technical Note/SolarEdge Technologies/knowledge-center.solaredge.com;Rapid Shutdown in SolarEdge Systems (Rest of World)/SolarEdge Technologies/knowledge-center.solaredge.com;P-Series Add-on Power Optimizer Datasheet (North America)/SolarEdge Technologies/knowledge-center.solaredge.com;Power Optimizer and String Troubleshooting Guide (North America)/SolarEdge Technologies/knowledge-center.solaredge.com;Inverter Installation Guide (Appendix: SafeDC)/SolarEdge Technologies/knowledge-center.solaredge.com;Firefighter Gateway Installation Guide/SolarEdge Technologies/knowledge-center.solaredge.comSafeDC safe output voltage of 1 V ± 0.1 V (measured 0.8 to 1.2 V), string open-circuit voltage = number of optimizers × 1 V, conditions for entering safe mode (PCS stop, AC loss, disconnection, over 85°C), rapid shutdown activation methods (AC disconnection, DC switch), condition of 30 modules or fewer per string, that there is no RSD standard in Europe and APAC, that SafeDC reach time is up to 5 minutes and 30-second compliance applies only to specific model numbers, design condition that the worst-case voltage under fault conditions, “Voc,max + (number of modules − 1) × 1 V,” is below 120 V, PCS capacitor discharge and the 3 to 5 minutes until the “safe” indication, and compliance markings for PVRSS and AFCI.
  10. Firefighter Safety and Photovoltaic Installations Research Project / Underwriters Laboratories (Backstrom, R., Dini, D. A.) / November 29, 2011 / fsri.org (summary)・report PDFExperiments on a live array of 26 panels and 5,980 W. The risk of electric shock from water spray depends on voltage, conductivity, distance, and spray pattern; firefighter gloves and boots are not substitutes for electrical protective equipment; simply opening a switch does not stop the array, and it remains energized while illuminated; light from a fire truck or an adjacent fire can also create a danger of inability to disengage; a damaged array can create current paths through the mounting structure, metal roof, and gutters; and the effects and limitations of blackout sheets.
  11. Points to note for firefighting operations in fires involving residential buildings with solar PV systems (administrative notice)/Fire and Disaster Management Agency/March 26, 2013 (Heisei 25)/fdma.go.jp;Fire Research Technical Material No. 83, “Fire Safety Measures for Solar PV System Fires and Firefighting Operations”/Fire and Disaster Management Agency, Fire and Disaster Management Research Center, Fire and Disaster Management College/March 2014 (Heisei 26)/nrifd.fdma.go.jp (posting page)Electric shock hazards from the initial stage of a fire through confirmation of smoldering remains, hazards of stream-type water application, electric shock through the building from cut wiring, continued power generation at night and under flame light, power generation by damaged modules, and countermeasures such as spray water application, insulating gloves, and shading. The existence and publication year of the Fire Research Center technical material.
  12. Guidelines for Fire Safety Measures Related to Photovoltaic Power Generation Equipment (outline and text)/Tokyo Fire Department Prevention Division/Published July 2014, operation started October 1/tfd.metro.tokyo.lg.jp (outline)・(text);Fire Safety Measures Required for Buildings Subject to Fire Prevention, Chapter 7 Fire Safety Measures Related to Photovoltaic Power Generation Equipment (study group report)/Tokyo Fire Department/tfd.metro.tokyo.lg.jpInstallation restrictions within 50 cm of entrances and around outdoor stairs, fire-fighting access routes within 24 m, electric shock warning signs at entrances on the route from PV modules to the inverter and along access routes, and the statement that “even if AC is disconnected, DC remains charged while light falls on the modules.”
  13. Verification of the hazards during firefighting operations for solar PV systems / Tokyo Fire Department (Fire Technology and Safety Institute Report) / tfd.metro.tokyo.lg.jpResults of water discharge, destruction, and flame exposure tests (no hazard from wetting alone, hazard when damaged or cut, voltage drop only at the damaged section, power generation continues even after flame exposure, maximum measured current of 10 mA), reference current levels for human response.
  14. Interpretation of the Technical Standards for Electrical Facilities / Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Industrial Safety and Security Group, Electricity Safety Division / amended on November 20, 2025 (Reiwa 7) / meti.go.jp (Electricity Business Act notices and internal rules posting page)・main text PDFArticle 200, paragraph 2 (installation of small-scale power generation facilities and solar cell power generation facilities): prohibition of exposed live parts, switches located near the load-side connection point of the array, overcurrent protection devices for parallel circuits, and wiring construction methods. The same page also includes the interpretation of the technical standards for solar cell power generation facilities.
  15. Guide and technical information for DC electrical safety in solar PV systems (2nd edition) / National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology / April 2019 / unit.aist.go.jpEven after operation stops, modules continue to generate open-circuit voltage; typical system voltages are around 300 V for general use, 600 V for private use, and 1000 V; DC has no zero crossing, so arcs are difficult to extinguish; the rapid shutdown section (purpose, design guidelines, comparison table of VDE/NEC/Japan, with Japan listed as "no provisions"); and the note in PCS manuals to wait 3 to 20 minutes.
  16. Accident Cause Investigation Report based on Article 23, paragraph 1 of the Consumer Safety Act — Fire accidents originating from residential solar PV systems / Consumer Safety Investigation Committee (Consumer Affairs Agency) / January 28, 2019 (Heisei 31) / caa.go.jp127 cases from March 2008 to November 2017, 72 cases investigated, 13 module/cable cases, 59 PCS/connection box cases, the main cause of cable fires being installation defects (pinching, etc.), the risk of fire spread in systems without steel plates, and an accumulated installed count of about 2.37 million buildings (as of October 2018).
  17. Accidents involving residential solar PV equipment (oral presentation materials) / National Institute of Technology and Evaluation (NITE) / 2018 / nite.go.jp; Product Safety Information Magazine Vol. 473 "Accidents Involving Solar PV Equipment" / NITE / March 25, 2025 / nite.go.jp; Press release "Pay attention to accidents involving residential solar cell power generation equipment" / NITE / August 29, 2025 (Reiwa 7) / nite.go.jpA high proportion of connection box accidents involved installation defects, and there are cases of PCS water ingress and tracking. Of roughly 200 accidents in fiscal 2014 to 2023, about 70% involved PCS and just under 20% involved modules; secondary injury prevention from electric shock caused by damaged or waterlogged modules and disconnected cables; and the obligation to comply with technical standards even for facilities under 10 kW (Electricity Business Act Article 56).
  18. Materials on solar PV (technical materials and self-regulatory rules list) / Japan Photovoltaic Energy Association (JPEA) / jpea.gr.jp; Solar PV System Maintenance and Inspection Guidelines (JM19Z001) / Japan Electrical Manufacturers' Association (JEMA) and JPEA / established in December 2016, revised on December 27, 2019 / PDF; Self-regulatory rules on labeling of DC wiring sections in residential solar PV systems / JPEA Residential Division / August 1, 2016 / PDF; Layout and labeling for public and industrial solar PV facilities / JPEA / September 2014 / PDF; On the risk of electric shock during flooding of solar PV systems / JPEA / May 2019 / PDF; Request for prevention of electric shock from submerged solar cell power generation facilities (notice) / Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry / July 2017 and July 2018 / meti.go.jpInspection items based on IEC 62446, the industry's own statement that "even if grid-side power is cut off, voltage continues to be generated as long as there is sunlight," and labeling requests from the National Fire Chiefs Association; identification labels for DC wiring (striped cables and tags); the labeling scope corresponding to Tokyo Fire Department standards; the fact that even submerged or flooded equipment generates over 300 V when exposed to light; reduced insulation after water recedes; the need to have a specialist disconnect modules and connection boxes; and the prohibition on approaching while submerged and the need to wear protective equipment.
  19. Q.TRON BLK M-G2+ datasheet (108 half-cells, 420 to 440 W) / Qcells / media.qcells.com; Vertex S+ TSM-NEG9R.28 datasheet (144 half-cells, 430 to 460 W) / Trina Solar / 2024 / static.trinasolar.com (PDF)Examples of open-circuit voltage Voc: 39.32 V for the 430 W model (temperature coefficient −0.24%/K, maximum system voltage 1000 V), and 52.9 V for the 445 W model. Voc is determined by the number of cells in series and increases at low temperatures. Confirm the specific model in the datasheet for each installation.
  20. Communication Signal for Rapid Shutdown — SunSpec Interoperability Specification / SunSpec Alliance / August 27, 2019 (Rev. 36), approved version on April 20, 2021 / sunspec.org・specification PDFA communication specification for interoperability among multiple manufacturers and multiple devices that supports module-level rapid shutdown under NEC 2014, 2017, and 2020 and UL 1741; that NEC applies to PV on buildings and not to ground-mounted systems; that the module-level requirement took effect on January 1, 2019; and that NEC compliance is possible even without this communication specification, in which case it is outside the scope of this specification.
  21. TS4-A-F product page / Tigo Energy / tigoenergy.com; IQ8 Series Microinverters Installation and Operation Manual / Enphase Energy / enphase.com; PV Link & SnapRS Installation Manual / Generac Power Systems / generac.com (PDF); RSD-S-PLC Datasheet Rev3.1 / APsystems (APsmart) / February 2025 / apsmartglobal.com (PDF)Dedicated RSD output of 0.6 V per unit when stopped and string voltage below 30 V, PVRSS certification in combination with multiple PCS units, microinverters listed as UL 1741 PVRSE and compliant with NEC 2014 to 2023 690.12, configurations using in-string inserted switches to keep the area within the array boundary at 80 V or less within 30 seconds, fail-safe operation that stops when the transmitter signal is lost, and the fact that RSD does not have arc detection functionality.
  22. Design and Construction Guidelines for Ground-Mounted Solar PV Systems (2025 edition) / New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization (NEDO) / 2025 / nedo.go.jp (posting page)・main text PDF; JIS C 62548:2023 Design requirements for photovoltaic (PV) arrays / Japanese Standards Association (draft prepared by the Japan Electrical Manufacturers' Association) / established on January 20, 2023 / webdesk.jsa.or.jp; Notice of establishment of JIS C 63027:2025 / Osaka Electro-Communication University (draft committee) / November 2025 / osakac.ac.jp; Certification work rules for grid-interconnection protection devices, etc. / Japan Electrical Safety & Environment Technology Laboratories (JET) / January 2025 / jet.or.jp; Industrial Safety and Health Regulations, Articles 339 to 341 / Japan Industrial Safety and Health Association / jaish.gr.jpNEDO 2025 edition, section 13.2.4 (disconnecting means within the array, switches for each string, live during daytime, risk of DC arc above 30 V), 13.4.7 (arc fault detection and interruption), and chapter 15 (UL 3741 as a reference for firefighter protection, remote-operable shutdown means are desirable). Scope of JIS C 62548:2023 (open-circuit voltage from 30 V to 750 V). Content of JIS C 63027:2025 (detect and interrupt within 2.5 seconds after arc occurrence or before reaching 750 J, based on IEC 63027:2023). JET certification covers grid-interconnection protection, electrical safety, and EMC. Requirements for outage work (locking and labeling switches, discharging residual charge, and voltage testing).
  23. Public website for renewable energy project certification information (certification and installed capacity summary) / Agency for Natural Resources and Energy / as of the end of December 2025 (updated in June 2026) / fit-portal.go.jp; Materials 1 for the 110th meeting of the Committee on Calculation of Procurement Prices, etc. / Agency for Natural Resources and Energy / 2025 / meti.go.jp (PDF); Expiration of the FIT purchase period approaching for residential solar PV / Agency for Natural Resources and Energy / February 19, 2019 / enecho.meti.go.jpResidential (under 10 kW) certification counts: 2,542,603 new certifications and 1,196,429 transition certifications; non-residential (10 kW and above): 704,245. Installed capacity: 76.8 million kW (as of the end of March 2025), with 10 to 50 kW accounting for about 31% on a capacity basis. Post-FIT cases totaled about 530,000 in November to December 2019, and about 1.65 million cases and 6.7 million kW by 2023.
  24. VDE-AR-E 2100-712:2018-12 Measures for the DC side of a photovoltaic system to maintain electrical safety in the event of firefighting or technical rescue operations / DKE (VDE) / 2018 (first edition May 2013) / dke.de; IEC 60364-7-712:2017 Low-voltage electrical installations — Part 7-712: Requirements for special installations or locations — Solar photovoltaic (PV) power supply systems (preview) / IEC / 2017 / standards.iteh.ai (PDF)The German application rule establishes DC-side measures as "supplementary recommendations" on the premise that modules generate voltage even when the AC side is disconnected, in order to reduce the probability of firefighters receiving electric shock. IEC 60364-7-712 requires a switch-disconnector for isolating the PCE for each PV array and does not include a rapid shutdown requirement for firefighters.
  25. Electrical and Thermal Finite Element Modeling of Arc Faults in Photovoltaic Bypass Diodes (SAND2012-0743) / Sandia National Laboratories (Johnson, J., Bower, W., Quintana, M.) / January 2012 / energy.sandia.gov (PDF)DC arcs do not pass through current zero every half cycle like AC arcs, so extinguishing them is much more difficult.
  26. EI Inverter (US) - Fault and Warning Codes / Tigo Energy Help Center / support.tigoenergy.com; Tigo Energy Intelligence EI Inverter Manual / Tigo Energy / October 2021 / tigoenergy.com (PDF)How to handle fault and warning code 204, "Disconnect function abnormal" (stop the system -> check the disconnect wiring -> if it is not resolved, contact Tigo Support). The DC disconnect switch is located at the bottom of the inverter; before opening the wiring box, turn the disconnect switch OFF and wait 5 minutes; shutdown sequence (battery storage -> inverter DC -> AC); clean the contacts by turning the rotary DC disconnect switch ON -> OFF 5 times once a year.

This article is based on laws, standards, and technical materials published as of September 26, 2026 (On October 29, 2026, Tigo EI code 204 was added as an example in the manufacturer's fault table. On November 8, 2026, the title and lead were returned to the main text, and the example was moved to a note). The post-shutdown voltage of individual equipment varies depending on the string configuration, equipment model and settings, and wiring route, so it must be confirmed by measurement. For interpretations of laws and standards, priority is given to publicly available materials from the competent authorities.