Attackers do not choose targets by motive. They choose by the ratio of the cost required to reach them, the gain if successful, and the burden if attributed. The draft revision of the grid connection technical requirements guideline (e-Gov case number 620340012) shifts this ratio in the attacker’s favor. Demand for new installations and replacements concentrates on the product groups that passed the label, and the capacity belonging to the same firmware distribution system and same control plane increases (the gain per cost of access increases). The label becomes an outward sign of being "countermeasure-ready," and boundary defenses and limits on reachable capacity on the installation side are more likely to be omitted (the cost of access goes down). And because it is a system described as excluding specific products, a successful compromise damages the credibility of the system itself (the gain exceeds technical damage). The most valuable target is the manufacturer’s update distribution server and signing key, and JC-STAR Star 1 does not evaluate that.
Explainer video (about 9 min)
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1. Criteria an attacker uses to select a target
Publicly available cases of attacks on power equipment share a common pattern in how targets are chosen. Rather than taking down individual weakly defended devices one by one, they use a path that can reach many devices at once in a single access.
| Case | route reached | scope reached at the same time |
|---|---|---|
| Ukrainian power distribution grid (December 2015 and December 2016) | From intrusion into an operations terminal to the control plane of distribution SCADA. In 2016, malware directly operated substation protocols (IEC 60870-5-104, etc.) | In 2015, about 230,000 customers lost power. In 2016, a substation north of Kyiv |
| Viasat KA-SAT (February 24, 2022) | Delivered destructive updates to modems from the satellite communications operator's ground management network | Tens of thousands of modems in Europe. In Germany, about 5,800 Enercon wind turbines lost remote monitoring |
| Danish energy operator (May 2023) | Vulnerabilities in the boundary device commonly used by operators (Zyxel firewalls) | According to a SektorCERT report, 22 operators were compromised simultaneously, and some were forced into island operation (disconnection from the grid) |
| SolarWinds Orion (2020) | Infiltrated the vendor's build environment for monitoring software and inserted malicious code into a legitimately signed update | Distributed simultaneously to about 18,000 organizations that applied the update |
What the four cases have in common is that the individual strength of the devices was not the issue. What was compromised was the management plane, distribution plane, and boundary devices that many devices commonly depend on, and once access was gained, many moved at the same time. Product-level certification does not evaluate this path.
2. Three conditions that the revision proposal must satisfy
The revised proposal itself does not write country names in the text. But the shape of the system after the制度 is enforced can be read from the text.
- As supply converges and the capacity belonging to a single distribution system increases, if labels are placed on the grid interconnection conditions, demand for new installations and replacements will concentrate on the product groups that have obtained the label. Because the product groups that obtain it are limited, the capacity belonging to the same manufacturer's same firmware distribution system and same cloud control plane becomes larger than it would be without the system. The draft revision does not include a rule that places an upper limit on the capacity that can move at the same time in a single incident (Cyber Blast Radius). This point was submitted to the competent authority as Comment 6 and accepted under receipt number 620340012420402491.
- With an outward appearance of being "already addressed," site-side defenses are likely to be omitted In its response dated July 26, 2026, IPA clearly states that the label indicates functions built into the product, and does not indicate that the product has been safely installed and operated. However, if the operational practice is to judge whether connection is allowed based on the label, installers, contractors, and general transmission and distribution operators will come to think that "the label is there, so that is enough." Site-side measures such as boundary defense, limiting reachable capacity, and output floors (minimum operating points) will be omitted to the extent they are costly, because they are not written into the requirements. The cost of reaching the system goes down.
- With an exclusionary context attached, the success of an intrusion affects the credibility of the system In public debate, this revision is being described as a measure aimed at products from a specific country. The competent authority has not said so explicitly, but the way it is received cannot be changed. If an intrusion succeeds under this context, the consequence is not limited to technical damage such as outages or output fluctuations. The fact that "the system that was supposed to be removed for safety was breached" itself becomes a greater gain for a state-like attacker than an outage. The cost stays the same, and only the gain increases.
3. The most valuable target, and the place the label does not see
From the three conditions, the most cost-effective target is the manufacturer's update distribution server and the firmware signing key. The reason is simple: if you reach that point, the update can be delivered through the legitimate path to all devices that have obtained the label at the same time. Signature verification on the device side cannot stop a malicious update that has been signed with the correct key.
The JC-STAR Star 1 conformity criteria check whether a product has a function to receive secure updates. How the server on the distribution side is operated, where the signing key is stored and who can use it, how revocation and re-signing are handled when the key leaks, and whether updates are distributed to all units at once or in stages—these are not product functions, so they are not evaluated. The IPA response saying it does not indicate installation or operation refers to this boundary.
| the point of reach from the attacker's perspective | the scope that operates when reached | Is it within the scope of JC-STAR★1 evaluation? |
|---|---|---|
| the management screen of a single device (default password, etc.) | that one unit | scope (such as eliminating default passwords) |
| network boundary at the installation site | equipment at that site | out of scope (installation side) |
| Manufacturer cloud control side (remote output control) | all units belonging to that control side | out of scope (operations side) |
| manufacturer's update distribution server / signing key | all units belonging to that distribution system, via the legitimate route | out of scope (operations side) |
The lower you go in the table, the broader the scope that can be affected by a single reach, and the farther it is from label evaluation. The draft revision is designed to determine connection eligibility by looking only at the top row of the table.
4. Materials needed to say it will not be targeted
To deny this structure, at least the following three documents are needed. All of them were requested in the public inquiry our company sent to the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy in July 2026.
| required materials | What must be shown to deny the structure | Response from the supervising authority (July 2026) |
|---|---|---|
| threat model | The assumed attacker, access path, and scope of damage are specified, and the update distribution side and control side are included | no material was shown as the basis for making it a requirement |
| comparative evaluation with alternative measures | A comparison showing that product selection by label is more effective than boundary defense or limiting reachable capacity | "There is no comparative material" |
| impact assessment | An estimate of how the capacity that operates simultaneously in one incident changes in a system after label requirements are introduced | is not shown. The comparison between IP and non-IP is "not from the perspective of requirements" |
The original text of the response is in the response dataset (CC BY 4.0), and the timeline with dates and question numbers is compiled in the ledger of foreseeability. It can be confirmed from the competent authority's own documents that there was no material at the stage of system design for determining that it would not be targeted.
5. Measures that can be taken now
Changing the structure requires revising the制度, but there are measures that can be taken without waiting for the制度. I will write by position.
installer / power producer / contractor
- Choose a configuration that continues operating even when separated from the manufacturer’s cloud control plane. For remote output control, separate the command path from the grid operator and the maintenance path from the manufacturer.
- Place your own device at the site boundary and list the communication destinations the equipment can reach. Do this regardless of whether there is a label.
- Require site-level specifications to state "behavior when communication is lost" and "minimum operating point." Avoid designs that drop to zero all at once through contracts.
- Choose equipment that does not apply updates automatically and can roll them out in stages. Make it possible for the operator to stop all units from receiving the same update on the same day.
manufacturer
- Keep the signing key for update distribution offline or in an HSM, and make it impossible to sign without dual approval. Publish the procedures for key revocation and re-signing.
- Updates should not be distributed to all units at once, but in staged releases divided by region and capacity. The design should allow stopping if anomalies appear after distribution.
- The manufacturer sets an upper limit on the capacity that can be operated at once on the remote control side.
- These points should be written as public specifications, separate from obtaining the label. Our company will sequentially send public inquiries including these points to major domestic and overseas manufacturers, and record whether there is a response in the ledger.
supervising authority / general transmission and distribution utility
- Set a condition for connection that places an upper limit on the capacity that can move simultaneously from a single compromise. This is the same idea as NERC CIP-002, which separates impact levels by MW per asset.
- Apply to solar PV and battery storage the same "equivalent functions" recognized for wind power. Do not close off paths where equivalent effects can be achieved through defenses on the installation side.
- Disclose the threat model, comparative evaluation, and impact assessment before enforcement. If they do not exist, create them before enforcement.
Reader
Public comments on the draft revision are being accepted until November 6, 2026. Submission method and draft wording are prepared. If you submit the points of this article as they are, narrowing them to two points—"placing an upper limit on the capacity that can move at the same time in a single incident" and "including the update distribution plane and control plane in the threat model"—will make it easier for the competent authority to respond.
What this document does not say
We are not saying that a specific country or business operator is planning an attack. We are not predicting when or how likely an attack is to occur. We are also not saying that JC-STAR Star 1 is ineffective. Eliminating default passwords and mandating update functions are meaningful against intrusion into a single device. We are not determining that the ministry or the system operator intended targeting. What we are stating is only the result of applying the system shape created by the draft revision to the attacker’s selection criteria—cost of access, gain, and attribution burden—and the fact that, according to the ministry’s response, no materials exist to deny that result. We do not address the presence or absence of vulnerabilities in individual products, individual connection refusals, or the outcome of lawsuits.
Source
- Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, "Draft Revision of the Grid Connection Technical Requirements Guideline Related to Securing Power Quality" and public comment instructions (published October 6, 2026, e-Gov case number 620340012, submission deadline November 6, 2026)
- Responses to our public questions by the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, Electricity Infrastructure Division (July 13, 16, and 30, 2026), and responses by the IPA Security Center, Technical Evaluation Division (July 19, 25, and 26, 2026). The original is the response dataset, and the process is the ledger of foreseeability
- E-ISAC / SANS ICS, "Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid" (2016); ESET, "Industroyer" (2017)
- Viasat, "KA-SAT Network cyber attack overview" (March 30, 2022); Enercon announcement (February 28, 2022, loss of remote monitoring for approximately 5,800 units)
- SektorCERT, "The attack against Danish, critical infrastructure" (November 2023)
- CISA, "Emergency Directive 21-01: Mitigate SolarWinds Orion Code Compromise" (December 13, 2020)
- NERC CIP-002-5.1a "BES Cyber System Categorization"; Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 (Cyber Resilience Act); Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (NIS2)
- Our "It is not about scale. It is about the attainment structure." "From Cybersecurity to Cyber-Resilience" "Verification of the revised proposal" "Full text of the submitted comments"
益田 周防海(Suomi Masuda)/ I-S3 Co., Ltd. Based on public materials and the written responses received. This is not an evaluation of any specific product or business operator, nor is it advice on any individual contract or lawsuit.