It is not about scale.
is an access structure.

If even small residential inverters are included in grid-connection cyber requirements, the risk cannot be ignored. So how should it be protected? Individual equipment compliance labels are not enough—that is a principle of network security and has nothing to do with the size of the power plant. For solar PV as well, as with wind power, it is reasonable to protect it with a policy centered on perimeter defense.

Written by Suomi Masuda / I-S3 Co., Ltd. | Published: July 26, 2026 | Reading time: 12 min

Explanatory video (Japanese, English, Chinese) Structure Risks at the household scale Failure of the means Same policy as wind power Alternative proposal

Policy review Based on IPA’s first to third responses METI response received (2026-07-30) This article does not expose intent. It fixes the structure that can be read from the public record, and asks whether grid interconnection entry requirements can be explained under that structure. IPA’s responses to the inquiries were prompt and sincere, and the target of criticism is the repurposing of the system—the design of incorporating it into grid interconnection requirements. Follow-up: We have received responses from METI to all 28 questions and published an analysis article.
Not size. Reachability structure. — Design grid interconnection cybersecurity with boundary defense

What you can understand in 30 seconds

Explanatory video — Japanese, English, and Chinese

It is not scale but reachability structure. If residential equipment is included, the risk cannot be ignored, and individual equipment labels do not indicate installation safety——a policy review explaining that solar PV, like wind power, should also be based on boundary defense, in videos in Japanese, English, and Simplified Chinese.

LanguageTitleOn-site viewingYouTube
Japanese Deconstructing the paradox of JC-STAR mandatory adoption — it is not scale. It is reachability structure. Reproduction Watch
English The Illusion of Labels — Size Doesn't Matter. Reachability Does. Reproduction Watch
Simplified Chinese The illusion of grid security: deconstructing interconnection requirements — scale ≠ reachability structure Reproduction Watch

There is also a short version that compresses the key points into 60 seconds: Japanese / English / Simplified Chinese.

Latest work — Dissecting METI’s 28 answers (July 30, 2026, Japanese, English, Chinese): Japanese / English / Simplified Chinese|Full responses and analysis.

The entire series is collected in a playlist.

1. Visible structure—an entrance cut by product category

Fact In the整理 of the grid code review, for new grid interconnection of solar power and battery storage, the direction is to require the use of JC-STAR★1 certified products for control systems with communication functions (PCS, EMS, etc.). The application is said to begin in April 2027 for extra-high voltage and high voltage, and in October 2027 for low voltage (under 50 kW), and it extends to small-scale systems close to residential use.

Fact On the other hand, JC-STAR★1 itself is, as IPA’s response states, a “minimum unified compliance requirement for all IoT devices,” and it was not created specifically for power, renewable energy, or grid code purposes. It does not introduce the concept of perimeter defense, nor does it include risk reduction through external boundaries in its evaluation. ★1 is designed on the assumption that it directly receives communications from outside (first response・third response).

Analysis Here, the structure of system repurposing becomes visible. The label system is for general-purpose IoT. Incorporation into grid interconnection draws the line by the product category of energy control equipment. There is also an arrangement that excludes devices via gateways, so the focus at the entry point becomes not the entire reach path but “which box has the label.”

If the same logic were pushed to "devices with IP communication in general" or "all reachable terminals on a home network," what would happen? Personal computers, tablets, smartphones, general-purpose IoT, home routers — definition, verification of effect, operational feasibility, and accountability would all be questioned at once, and it would likely become a full-scale debate involving cybersecurity experts. At that point, an entry requirement with weak logic would not hold up.

Structure That is why the current design can be read as functioning as a category split closed to energy equipment and its surrounding devices. This is not a determination that it was “cleverly evaded.” What can be read from the public record is the fact that the line is drawn that way. If a line is drawn, why that line—technical justification is needed.

2. Risks at the household scale cannot be ignored

If homes are included, the risk argument cannot be confined to "mega-solar only".

In terms of capacity per unit, utility-scale solar is larger. That is a fact. But cyber risk is not determined by kW of a single unit alone.

Analysis We do not claim that "households are always more serious than rural mega-solar plants." The threat model differs by scale and connection type. All that can be said is the following. Households and low-voltage groups can become a distinct risk cluster that cannot be ignored at the intersection of quantity, configuration variability, and urban demand. Once they are included as targets at the grid interconnection entry point, security cannot be reduced to "a label is enough."

If you acknowledge the risk, the means become the question. If you do not acknowledge the risk, the reason to require it even for residential systems disappears. Which will you choose?

3. Then how should security be handled

This is the turning point of the main argument. If you accept the premise that cyber risk for distributed energy resources, including residential-scale systems, cannot be ignored, then there is only one question. How do you protect them.

The candidate means generally converge on the following two.

Meanswhat to look atreality at household scale
Individual device certification (product label) Conformity requirements for the enclosure (including self-declaration of conformity) It barely considers installation configuration, reachability paths, operations, or the in-home LAN. Opening ports after label acquisition does not change the label's effect (IPA)
Boundary, configuration, and operation (network security) Who can reach it from where, separation, directional control, authentication, logs, update responsibility The same principle regardless of scale. It can be implemented as a gateway / equivalent defense / duty of care

International discussions on control system security — IEC 62443 Zone & Conduit, boundary defense and continuous operational management for critical infrastructure — are on the latter side. Product hygiene (hardening) is necessary, but it is not designed so that it alone can replace security at the grid interconnection entry point.

4. Why individual device certification breaks down

Fact IPA states this clearly: obtaining a conformity label does not indicate that the equipment is "safely installed and operated." What it indicates is that the equipment within the scope of the label has the requirements for ★1 conformity. Its effect does not change depending on the installation location. It is the manufacturer vendor's self-declaration of conformity, not a confirmation or guarantee of complete safety (Answer 3).

If this is placed at the grid interconnection entry point on a residential scale, the following failures occur at the same time.

  1. Confirming what you do not see as if you had confirmed it — What the review can confirm is "a box with a label," not open ports, whether VPN is present, paths to a monitoring cloud, or smartphone app integration
  2. Operations cannot be tracked — The configuration of homes and small businesses differs from site to site, and label verification at the time of interconnection does not capture later changes
  3. Exceptions and invisibility — Exceptions are not distinguished on the list, and statistics are not disclosed. From the outside, it is impossible to reproduce what the entry-point "verification" actually verified
  4. Arbitrary category splitting — General-purpose PCs and routers on the same LAN remain outside the entry-point requirements, and when only the PCS is labeled, JC-STAR makes "no mention whatsoever" of general-purpose PCs (IPA)

Conclusion If we acknowledge the risk and include residential use, individual equipment labels are operationally difficult and of little effect. This is not an emotional argument. It is the result, at residential scale, of the official fact that labels do not indicate installation safety.

5. Apply the same policy to solar PV as to wind power

Fact In the materials for the 21st Grid Code Review Meeting, for wind power generation, an early application limited to gateway firewalls (or devices with equivalent protective functions) is presented. For solar PV and battery storage, the direction is to require JC-STAR★1 certification for all control systems with communication functions.

Question Why can wind power be centered on boundary devices, while solar PV is subject to a broad net of product labels? The reason the network principle changes by power source has still not been explained in the public record (supplementary inquiry to the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy Q25).

If we stand on the principles of network security, the answer is simple.

What must be protected is not the size of the power plant. It is the reach structure. For both solar PV and wind power, it is reasonable to design them under the same policy centered on boundary defense.

Whether household or utility-scale, the question is the same. Who can reach the control plane, and through which path? How is that path separated, how is it monitored, and how is update responsibility assigned? A design that cuts the entry point by product category does not answer that question.

6. Toward an access structure—the consequence of institutional repurposing

I will compress the argument.

  1. Cybersecurity measures for grid interconnection that include homes cannot ignore risk
  2. If the risk is acknowledged, an individual device conformity label is not enough (it does not officially indicate installation safety)
  3. If it is insufficient, there is no choice but to move to boundary, configuration, and operations——the principles of network security
  4. That principle is unrelated to the size of the power plant, and applying the same policy to solar PV as to wind power is reasonable
  5. Therefore, the current substitution that places ★1 certification for control-system products at the center of the interconnection entry point is inconsistent both in terms of scale and in terms of network theory

At this point, the assessment that it is "utterly nonsensical" should be read not as an insult, but as a technical judgment on the lack of design consistency. In language suitable for public documents: it lacks explainability as an interconnection entry requirement, is inconsistent with the mainstream of international standards, and the means do not match the safety purpose, including at residential scale.

Alternative proposal We have already published a "minimum duty of care" approach that does not trust the product but verifies the configuration. Regardless of nationality or manufacturer, it imposes separation, boundaries, directional control, logs, and update management on the equipment side, and positions JC-STAR as supplementary deemed conformity. A tiered approach according to scale is also possible. For details, see the full alternative proposal and detailed explanation of the benefits.

What remains is to fix accountability on the side that is advancing the requirements. Is the Gateway exclusion premised on the effect of boundary defense (Q19)? Does the interconnection requirement verify product conformity or installation safety (Q26)? Why is the wind-power boundary-device approach not applied to solar PV (Q25)? — These have already been published as supplementary inquiries.

7. What can be stated and what cannot

assertdo not assert
The requirements are structured so that lines are drawn by product category The motive that it was "intentionally and cleverly narrowed to avoid a fuss"
The risks for homes and low-voltage groups cannot be ignored (they can become independently serious) An unconditional comparison that says "homes are always more dangerous than mega-solar"
The label does not indicate installation safety (explicitly stated by IPA) That the IPA system itself is improper or unnecessary
As with wind power, a boundary-based approach is reasonable for solar PV The current wind power proposal is the finished form (the issue is consistency)
The current repurposing is difficult to explain as a grid interconnection entrance requirement The intent to exclude specific manufacturers (the resulting structure is a separate issue)

Even without proving intent, the structure can be cornered. Fact that it is narrowed → if it is narrowed, an explanation is needed → if there is no explanation, it is weak as an interconnection entry point. If the risk is acknowledged, the means are questioned; as a means, labels are not enough, and the system is forced toward the boundary — this is the logic of this article.